Summer League Scouting: Cade Cunningham

18 Wednesday Aug 2021

Tags

From Cade Cunningham to Jamorko Pickett, Pistons leave Summer League on a wave of momentum | Detroit Pistons

Cade Cunningham entered the season with comparisons to Luka Doncic or Ben Simmons with a jump shot as a primary creating wing star. As an NCAA freshman, his creation sorely disappointed, and those comparisons became unrealistic, but there was still clear potential to be a Khris Middleton or Jayson Tatum level wing creator.

Since the draft, a couple of pieces of new information have come to light. First, Cade was listed at 6’6″ on Detroit’s official roster after being listed at 6’8″ in college. The Pistons and other teams were using height in shoes for these measurements, although it was inconsistent how teams approaching rounding. The Pistons listed John Petty at 6’5 after he measured 6’5.75″, so it is plausible Cade is actually 6’6.5″ or 6’6.75″ in shoes. And he still should have a 7’+ wingspan, as he measured 7’0.25″ in 2019.

For the sake of argument, let’s say that Cade is 6’6.5″ with 7’0.5″ wingspan. Those are still good wing dimensions, but they aren’t as good as advertised, which is a hit to his value.

Then summer league offered a decent litmus test for his creation ability. There was a common narrative that Cade was a much better shot creator in AAU, so his performance at Oklahoma State was uncharacteristic because of bad teammates and/or the pandemic. Then Cade came out and confirmed that Oklahoma State was indicative of his true creation talent, as he continued to lack the athletic pop or ball handling ability to get past defenders and create easy shots.

His NCAA offensive statistics were not all that far behind those of Tatum, but their rookie summer league is where they start to diverge heavily. Per 40 minute stats:

Player	2P	2PA	2P%	FTA	AST	TOV
Tatum	7.6	16.5	46.3%	5.6	1.9	3.1
Cade	3.9	11.1	34.8%	1.0	3.4	5.8

This is only 3 games for Cade vs. 6 for Tatum, and Cade would look much more respectable with one good game. But this difference is nevertheless huge. Tatum was creating much higher volume inside the arc with much greater efficiency, getting to the line much more frequently, with a significantly lower turnover rate.

Cade had a decent advantage in assist rate but not in assist:TOV. Further, at least 3 of his 7 assists were somewhat cheap where his teammates scored off the dribble after receiving a pass from Cade.

Cade did shoot 13/26 from 3 vs. 4/12 from Tatum in spite of less than half of the minutes. But since Tatum has become a 39.6% 3P shooter on high volume, there is limited room for Cade to provide more shooting value in the NBA.

Tatum is an example of a player who instantly showed more potential than he did as a good but not elite NCAA freshman, so it should not be surprising that he has solidly outperformed his college stats. Conversely, Cade has had all of his weaknesses amplified in summer league which bodes ill for his odds of reverting to his AAU creating self.

Granted, it is not a death knell. Khris Middleton was only slightly better than him as an NCAA creator at the same age, and a year older in summer league he showed little creation promise in a 14% usage role. So there still is room for Cade to provide competence in this regard long term, it just looks extremely dicey and is nowhere in the vicinity of where it was originally estimated.

Reasonable Upside Comp

There are a couple of positively redeeming qualities of summer league for Cade. First, he showed better activity and effort on defense than he did in college, averaging 1.7 steals and 1.3 blocks in his 3 summer league games. He still made mistakes and was beat on multiple occasions, but he has the tools and instincts to be a good defensive player, and this improved effort was a step in the right direction.

Second, he got off a huge volume of 3PA that he made at 50%. The percentage doesn’t mean much in a vacuum since it’s such a small sample of shots, but he attempted 12.5 3’s per 40 minutes compared to 6.5 as a college freshman. He collectively attempted more 3’s than 2’s which is a good idea for him– between college and summer, he collectively has made 41.4% of 3s and 45.1% of 2s.

This was also a direction he trended in toward the end of his college career. He had more 3PA than 2PA in only 1 of his first 22 NCAA games, before attempting more 3PA in each of his final 5 games.

Even if his creation struggles persist, he still may be salvageable as a good 3 + D player with one clear optimistic comp: Klay Thompson.

It’s not a perfect statistical comparison since Klay stayed for 3 college years and steadily improved each season, but his average age over his career was only 7.5 months older than Cade. Let’s see how their numbers compare using Klay’s career stats:

	Age	Usg	2P%	OR%	DR%	AST%	A:TOV	STL%	BLK%	FTr
Cade	19.3	28.6	0.461	2.3	16.4	20.4	0.86	2.5	2.3	39
Klay	19.9	28.6	0.45	3.3	13.4	18.4	0.90	2.4	2.4	25.6

They are basically twins. Cade’s age is an advantage, but given Klay’s continuous improvements over his career, it’s not a major one. Klay has developed in a player who has made 51%+ of his 2PA for his past 4 NBA seasons with a low turnover rate, which is about as good as one could have hoped his offense outside of 3P would have developed based on pre-draft.

As a non-shooting offensive player, Cade may be better or he may be worse. He has potential to draw more free throws and make a bigger impact as a passer, but if he spends too much time dribbling in circles, taking bad shots, and turning it over without significant improvements, he has potential to be a net negative in the categories where Klay took a huge leap.

Collectively, he has more potential to be worse creatively than Klay than better since he only showed slightly more potential in college, and Klay had such a good development arc.

NCAA shooting signal:

	3PA/100	3P%	FT%
Cade	8.9	0.4	0.846
Klay	11.4	0.39	0.829

Klay had a higher 3PA rate, but Cade had slightly better %’s as a freshman than Klay’s career averages so it’s within his range of outcomes to be a Klay level shooter if he can catch up in volume.

As a shooter, Klay is a career 41.9% 3P on high volume. He has 7 of the top 40 3PM in a season for players who converted 40%+ from 3, Steph has 8 of these seasons, and nobody else has more than 2. Cade’s shooting was so good as a freshman that we cannot rule out that he is a slightly better shooter than Klay, but he needs to be a top 2 shooter of all time for that to happen. More likely he shoots 39% to 40% on slightly lower volume, which would make him about ~1 point worse per 100.

Cade has similar defensive versatility to Klay and similar NCAA steal, block, and rebound rates. But Klay developed into an above average defensive player, and Cade is unlikely to be a stopper. Cade has some potential to be slightly better than Klay on this end, but he is more likely to be average or a worse.

It’s clear why Klay Thompson was available at 11th overall in his draft– he was a good mold of 3 + D, but needed a number of things to go right to develop into the low end all-star that he is today. And Cade Cunningham is in a similar boat, as his pre-draft profile isn’t all that much stronger in spite of his #1 overall status.

But Cade Priors from High School and AAU were Elite

How much does this really matter? High school scouts get it wrong all of the time. If we look at recent prospects with #1 preseason hype that fell flat in college, it’s difficult to find any compelling examples where the high school priors should have been weighed heavier than NCAA performance:

Prospect	RSCI	Draft Slot	Draft Year
Cole Anthony	3	15	2020
Cam Reddish	2	10	2019
Harry Giles	2	20	2017
Skal Labissiere	2	28	2016
Jahlil Okafor	1	3	2015
Andrew Wiggins	1	1	2014
Jabari Parker	2	2	2014
Shabazz Muhammad	1	14	2013
Austin Rivers	2	10	2012
Harrison Barnes	1	7	2012
OJ Mayo	1	3	2008

Granted, this is a subjective list with no clear criteria other than myself intuitively feeling scammed by the players that showed up relative to pre-existing hype. You could argue that Marvin Bagley, Mo Bamba, and Emmanuel Mudiay also belong on the list as negative examples, but they were all in highly flawed molds that were about as good as expected. RJ Barrett, Jayson Tatum, and Jaylen Brown could be added as positive examples, but they were all about as good as advertised. They all had their flaws, but showed enough strength such that they had clear upside with no reason to be aggressively bearish.

If we focus on the above list there are a few common trends. First– not a single prospect who slipped in the draft was a wrongful overreaction. Muhammad, Giles, and Skal were complete busts, and if Cole Anthony’s recent summer league is any indication, he has good odds of following suit.

Austin Rivers looked like a bust early in his career, and then made significant improvements to become an OK-ish bench player. But he even at his peak he was a below average player. Cam Reddish was approximately replacement level as an NBA sophomore, and it’s difficult to get too excited over his upside but we will see if he can improve to a quality rotation player in time.

Everybody else was a top 3 pick, and Harrison Barnes likely would have been top 3 if he did not stay for his sophomore year and show limited improvement. Barnes ended up providing slightly above average slot value for #7 overall, but would have been below average for #2 or #3. Wiggins, Parker, Okafor, and Mayo all badly underperformed their slot value.

What can we learn from this? First, if we include Bagley, Bamba, and Mudiay, there is approximately one super hyped prospect that massively disappoints each year. Second, NBA talent evaluators seem to be much more forgiving of flaws for hyped prospects than they should.

It is too small of a sample to draw any firm conclusions, but it is worth wondering if having extreme pre-draft hype is more of negative signal than positive one for the guys who perform like ordinary lottery prospects. High school rankings are highly limited, but they do a good job of marking the prospects whose tools and skills offer clear potential for domination.

And if a player has potential to dominate, but does not dominate at the NCAA level, perhaps that is indicative of flaws that are cumulatively fatal for long term star potential. Maybe it is slower development than peers, or poor translation to higher levels of competition, or a lack of basketball IQ that was not easily discernible in high school. Regardless, it seems that disappointment early in NCAA career may be predictive of continued longterm disappointment.

How Did Cade Fall Short?

In Cade’s case, the issue may largely be that he developed physically before his peers. He measured 6’6 in 2019 and is still listed at 6’6 today, and his athleticism is highly underwhelming relative to expectations. He played largely on stacked teams that were able to dominate in transition, and now that he is required to create against set defenses that are physically equal or greater to him, he is simply not that good at it.

He also was purported to be a wizard passer with elite basketball IQ, but perhaps that was because it is easier to stand out passing in transition on high school all-star teams. He has good court vision and is a willing passer, but his basketball IQ is somewhat of a mixed bag as he often makes poor decisions with the ball and has mediocre defensive IQ.

He also has an underwhelming motor. He had an anemic NCAA offensive rebound rate for his size, his effort on defense was poor, and he hardly ever scored on cuts, handoffs, or off screen with limited off ball movement. It was nice to see him step up the defensive effort in summer league, but he still may have a bad motor over the large sample.

Collectively these aren’t minor flaws that can be overcome with hard work. They cumulatively put a major dent in his current value to a basketball team, and are hardcoded enough to provide major resistance to him ever becoming a top 10 star in the NBA.

Pedigree Yields Endless Opportunities

Another reason for the pattern of disappointment may be that top recruits get every chance to showcase their potential. If Cade was #15 RSCI playing for a stacked Duke, Kentucky, or Kansas team, he wouldn’t get carte blanche to dribble in circles to his heart’s content. Perhaps he would have had a pedestrian 23% usg, 15% ast rate or so if he was simply one of many talented players as opposed to the highest rated recruit in program history.

He didn’t *need* to create everything for Oklahoma State. He was simply allowed to because of his pedigree. Isaac Likekele’s usg/ast rates dropped from 23%/30% to 17%/19% in order to give the reigns to Cade. He had the green light to accumulate as much bulk stats as possible, regardless of his bad shots, turnovers, and overdribbling. Yet he posted merely good but not elite bulk offensive output, with 28.6% usg and 20.4% ast rates with poor efficiency in spite of his excellent shooting.

Cade has now shown glaring weaknesses in his two most recent settings between NCAA and summer league. And when hyped prospects show unexpected weaknesses, they have historically not been overcome in the long term. At this point it is safe to dismiss Cade’s AAU/HS priors for the bullish case. And there remains the bearish concern that the early disappointment may be predictive of future disappointment.

The funny thing is that none of the other prospects on the list showed major unexpected strength. Whereas Cade was supposed to be an average-ish shooter who has shot the lights out. But everything that was supposed to be a big strength has been such a weakness, that collectively he has fallen well short of expectations as a generational prospect.

If there is a bright side, it’s that since he improved his shooting, he is likely working on his game and can perhaps apply his work ethic toward other aspects of his game and buck the trend of early disappointment continuing over the long term. But he has shown limited craft in figuring out how to create against NCAA or SL defenses thus far, and may just not have the innate ability to create at a high level in the NBA.

Conclusion

Cade still has potential to be a highly useful NBA player. He fits a solid 3 + D mold, and his passing and creation ability still has some chance to be similar to Khris Middleton with good development. He could be a sort of Middleton/Klay hybrid that becomes a low-end all-star and is a super useful cog that fits into any NBA lineup.

But that’s not the type of player that you target at #1 overall. Klay went 11th, and Middleton went 39th. Granted, Middleton’s hype suffered from starting school super young and getting hurt as a junior. If he started school a year later and was a one and done, he may have been a late lottery pick. Cade Cunningham performed at a similar level to both of them as an NCAA freshman, only he went #1 overall because of his high school and AAU hype.

Then in summer league, he continued to perform at that level. It was only 3 games, but that’s now his two most recent performances in different settings where he has looked nothing like a #1 overall.

The saving grace has been his exceptional development as a shooter, which in tandem with his defensive versatility makes him a highly useful mold. Even if he is a late lottery talent like Klay and Middleton, perhaps in the modern NBA that is more of a mid-lottery value.

He needs quite a bit to go right to become an all-star, but not all that much to go right to become an average starter that fits in a wide range of NBA lineups. He only needs to not force a bunch of negative creation and become competent on defense.

If we say he is likely a solid starter in a favorable mold with some potential to be a low end all-star in a hybrid Middleton/Klay mold if things go well, and some risk of going full Wiggins on us if he forces too much negative creation– it seems fair to price that player as a mid-lottery guy in this year’s draft. It’s difficult to see the top 10 potential in Cade that prospects like Evan Mobley, Jalen Suggs, Scottie Barnes, Josh Giddey, and Alperen Sengun offer. And if we are looking for a 3 + D wing, Franz Wagner is not on Cade’s level of a shooter, but could catch up in time. And Franz’s role playing IQ and defense is light years better than Cade on top of better dimensions.

Jalen Green is a more complex comparison, as he is seems more likely to hit his theoretical upside as a low end all-star SG like Zach LaVine, Bradley Beal, or Devin Booker…but that’s such a worse mold to build around, there’s a good case to be made that Cade nevertheless should be valued higher.

Cade is a strange and interesting case. He was supposed to be this star creator on the wing, and instead looks completely different as good but not elite 3 + D prospect. There may not be another prospect in history who badly disappointed in almost every regard outside of massively overperforming in one aspect like Cade has with shooting.

It is difficult to envision how somebody with such an odd arc will develop over the long term. But at this point, he has shown far too much weakness for his #1 recruiting hype and draft hype to be held onto. He still has all-star potential, but so do plenty of other players in a strong draft class. And if he has a path to being a top 10 NBA star, it is difficult to see it.

Draft Predictions Retrospective

24 Monday Aug 2020

Posted by deanondraft in Miscellaneous, NBA

≈ 3 Comments

hi-res-0024df4f53d645a8046a3eefd4e9c64c_crop_north

The draft is super hard to predict. Over my 6 years of blogging about the draft, I have made some good predictions and some bad ones. The predictions that sting me the most are the ones where I went too far pushing a “hot take.” The idea was nothing was at stake anyway, and if a contrarian opinion proves accurate, being more aggressive makes it look better in retrospect.

What I learned is that it’s extremely difficult to predict the next 15 years for a 19 year old kid. I have been wrong so many times, it now seems pointless to ever make any bold proclamations. It only makes my analysis less accurate, since more bold statements = more opportunities to be wrong. All I can do is look at the available information, assess the various possibilities for each prospect, and make an attempt at estimating their value.

The best thing I ever wrote questioned if Luka Doncic was the best prospect ever. The best part about the writeup is that I didn’t make any definitive statements, I merely presented facts and asked questions in an attempt to interpret it. The questions have since proved to be relevant, so I will focus on keeping that tone going forward

Anyhow, just for fun I will go back and review my year by year predictions since we have it all on record:

2014

This was my first year where I put the most effort, and also by far my best year. I was highly bearish on Jabari Parker and Andrew Wiggins as the top 2 picks.

I correctly rated Joel Embiid as the #1 overall pick, with Dante Exum, Aaron Gordon, and Marcus Smart rounding out the top 4. Some people may say Dante Exum at #2 looks bad in retrospect, but seeing that Embiid is the only real star at the top of the draft I don’t feel badly about it. I likely should have placed him at #4 below Smart and Gordon but this was a relatively minor miss for a shot at a mystery box.

I also correctly rated non-lotto bigs Jusuf Nurkic and Clint Capela above Parker + Wiggins at #5 and #6, which felt insane to do at the time yet somehow worked out.

I also had Nikola Jokic and Spencer Dinwiddie as 2nd round steals at #16 and #17 respectively.

I also had a few misses. Tyler Ennis piqued my interest but #9 was far too high for him. And while I feel I raised valid concerns about Julius Randle (#23), Zach LaVine (#35), and Rodney Hood (#57), I ranked all of them too low. But then after watching summer league, I actually noted that these were all of my opinions I felt worst about.

This was the season where I watched by far the most basketball both pre-draft and summer league, and really committed myself to understanding as much as possible. In retrospect I think my analysis was about as good as possible, and I may not ever analyze a draft this well again.

2015

This draft I gave much less effort than 2014 and it shows. I was far too low on Kristaps Porzingis (#12), Myles Turner (#20), Devin Booker (#22), and Terry Rozier (#50).

I also was sky high on Justise Winslow which hasn’t fully worked out, nor has it been a disaster. I ranked him #3 on my big board, and in the article I said I thought he was a better prospect than Jahlil Okafor and Emmanuel Mudiay which has proved to be accurate. But he also hasn’t nearly lived up to the massive potential I saw in him.

The bright side of this season was the only other player I wrote about: Josh Richardson. When he wasn’t even on the top 100 of anybody’s rankings, I wrote about how he was the hidden gem of the draft and ranked him #30.

I also had Larry Nance and Norman Powell as possible second round steals ranking them #32 and #33 respectively when they were getting relatively little attention (Nance going #27 was a big surprise). At least finding a few late steals somewhat salvaged this draft.

2016

This year was an unmitigated disaster. I had Ingram > Simmons, which is starting to look defensible, but Simmons is still the better talent and player and was the obvious #1.

I had Dragan Bender #3 which I don’t fully regret with such other few interesting options available, but I was too nevertheless too high based on a tiny sample of FIBA when he was 16.

Most notably I ranked Jamal Murray #12 and Buddy Hield #24 which is just awful considering how many terrible players I ranked ahead of them including #6 Deyonta Davis and #8 Timothe Luwawu. I was putting pretty low thought into my rankings, and in fairness I updated shortly after the draft to make all of these drastically more sane.

I did have a couple of decent ideas in the mix, with Dejounte Murray at #13 and Fred VanVleet #42 as a couple of later steals. But I don’t think this does much to salvage a bad overall ranking where I got too many things wrong.

2017

I was far too high on Lonzo Ball. I would still rank him #1 in retrospect because his strengths were so attractive, but I was far too dismissive of his flaws and downside risk.

I was also pretty high on most of the rest of the top 7. Fultz has flopped for somewhat unpredictable reasons– who could have known he was such a headcase? But then other than that Tatum, Fox, Isaac, and Markkanen all look pretty good while Josh Jackson has flopped.

I was correctly bearish on Dennis Smith Jr and ranked him #10, below OG Anunoby who I had #9. I had Donovan Mitchell #11 and I should have had him above DSJ.

Jarrett Allen at #27 was a small mistake and Bam at #28 was a big mistake.

This wasn’t my worst draft year, but it wasn’t my best either.

2018

This draft was so close to being good! I had my famous article on Luka, was bullish on Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, and had Josh Okogie and Kevin Huerter as solid 1st round picks when they weren’t in the consensus top 40.

But then I ruined it with too many hot takes. I still believe Trae Young is highly overrated and is not a player that I would want to build an NBA team around, but it’s clear that he has enough unique talent to be worth a top 10 pick. I went overboard on slandering him by ranking him 15th.

I also massively overhyped Jaren Jackson Jr. He was obviously the correct #2 prospect, and still is a very good one, but I made him 1b to Luka’s 1a which looks really bad in retrospect. I did ponder if he had GOAT upside, and frankly I don’t think it was a totally insane question. But he was so much less proven than Luka at the time, I really analyzed him through an excessively optimistic lens.

Also Zhaire Smith at #5 is a horrible take. I thought it was a good idea to gamble on athleticism, but he obviously had some big question marks that I glazed over too lightly.

Mikal Bridges at #18 was maybe a few slots too low. But I don’t feel too badly about this bc he still isn’t that exciting. We’ll see how he develops over the next few years.

I did correctly rate Jerome Robinson (#58) over Michael Porter Jr. (#9) as a horrific pick, and I had Gary Trent (#27) as a solid round 2 sleeper. I was too low on Mitchell Robinson, however, having him at #34.

Ultimately I feel that my analysis for this draft started off well, but I ended up taking too many unnecessary positions that were against the grain just to be different. I’d rate my analysis this draft collectively as OK, but nothing special.

2019

I didn’t even do a full writeup for this one because I didn’t feel like it. And it’s too early to say much about this draft with so much left to unfold, but so far my rankings look pretty good.

I was a huge bull on Ja Morant and PJ Washington. So far PJ looks like a one of the more solid guys outside of the top 2, and Ja looks like a future star.

It’s still too much to say about Ja, but I would still bet quite a bit that he goes on to have a better NBA career than Trae Young.

I was very low on DeAndre Hunter (#29) and Darius Garland (#19) who appear to be huge mistakes as top 5 picks.

And I had Terence Davis #39, which looks good for a UDFA.

I seem to have have underrated Cam Johnson at #38.

Other than that I didn’t have any strong opinions and we need more time to let things unfold. But I feel that I took fewer unnecessary bold positions than normal and overall I did a pretty decent job this year.

Conclusions

I have had ups and downs at predictions. I have had some good ideas that led to good predictions, and some slightly less good ideas that led to bad predictions.

I don’t know if I will ever replicate my 2014 performance where I was intently watching every top prospect in both NCAA and summer league. You can really get to know a prospect by watching a player repeatedly in a number of situations.

Since then I haven’t been watching as much, but I still believe there is enough available information to make decent broad strokes predictions between stats, scouting reports, youtube videos, etc.

My goal moving forward will be to be wrong as infrequently as possible. While it’s impossible to be right about everything, it’s easy to not be wrong by simply not taking firm positions when the answer is uncertain. I will still inevitably miss the mark plenty of times, but but by being more humble about the limits of my prediction capabilities the misses should grow to be less frequent and less severe over time.

Let’s see how the next 6 years compare to the first 6!

Did The Celtics Overpay for Kyrie Irving?

23 Wednesday Aug 2017

Posted by deanondraft in NBA

≈ 8 Comments

In a mega deal, the Boston Celtics sent Isaiah Thomas, Jae Crowder, Ante Zizic, and the Nets’ 2018 1st round pick for Kyrie Irving. I will break down this deal piece by piece:

Kyrie Irving vs Isaiah Thomas

These two players are near doppelgängers in the regular season, as they are both efficient scorers who give back much of their goodness on defense. But there are a few key factors in Kyrie’s favor that make him more attractive to the Celtics:

–Being the #1 pick vs Thomas’s #60, he has more natural talent that a coach like Brad Stevens may be able to help realize
–He is a bit more than 2 years younger and under team control for an additional year
–He has a stronger track record in the playoffs and clutch moments
–He is not coming off hip surgery

How much can Stevens help Kyrie?

The Celtics must believe Kyrie will explode under Stevens’ tutelage, as he already brought out the best in Jordan Crawford and Isaiah Thomas. And it is reasonable to expect some uptick, but how much upside is there?

Kyrie has been the same player for his 6 year career in Cleveland, and playing alongside LeBron he wasn’t leaving a bad situation. He has always struggled with passing and defense, and even if those improve slightly under Stevens it is difficult to envision those weaknesses going away entirely. And the shortest player on the floor cannot be elite with subpar passing and defense.

Further, it’s not like he is surrounded by a perfect cast of defense and shooting to maximize his scoring. This is especially true since they traded their best 3 + D player to acquire him.

In Boston’s favor, this is the most slippery aspect of the trade. Kyrie is outlier elite at creating his own offense efficiently, and his instincts are not broken. I was super high on him pre-draft, and he has been consistently above average without ever playing for a good coach ever since his 19 year old rookie season. He is still 25 and has some untapped potential, so there is some realistic chance he blossoms into a true star playing for Brad Stevens.

That said I wouldn’t bet on Kyrie being a top 5 PG next year, as he will likely remain inferior to Curry, Paul, Westbrook, Harden, Lowry, and Wall.

But He’s Clutch!

Kyrie’s isolation scoring ability tends to translate well to high leverage situations, and he has more potential to play competent defense in tense moments than Thomas who is 6 inches shorter. But in his 6 years with Cleveland, the Cavaliers overachieved at end games by a total of 3 wins, i.e. half a win per year. This is a nice tick to have but not overwhelmingly significant.

Further, the Celtics are left with a cast that has no prayer of winning a finals, let alone against a team like the Warriors. So whatever extra degree he has in the playoffs is hardly relevant as the base talent is not good enough to be a clutch play or two away from a championship.

At Least The Celtics Do Not Need To Max Isaiah

Giving Isaiah Thomas a big contract next offseason would have been a disaster, as he is not great now and speedy 5’9″ players do not age well. But Boston was never required to do so– they could have let him walk or traded him without including elite assets.

They only get 1 additional year of Kyrie under team control (at the cost of $33M extra since IT is discounted at $6.3M for 17-18), and then will need to offer him a max contract to keep him. That is not a favorable deal for Boston. He will not be a top 5 PG or top 25 player, and the Celtics will commit nearly $100M to Kyrie, Horford, and Hayward, which is a good but not great trio. They will likely not be able to add any meaningful pieces, and may have to let some current useful pieces go. Thus they are all in on their current personnel, which is not championship caliber.

How much more valuable is Kyrie?

Kyrie is an upgrade over IT in a handful of small ways, that collectively add up to a decent but not exceptional margin. Now let’s analyze the price paid:

Jae Crowder

There is an underlying assumption that Jae Crowder cannot be as good as his elite RPM suggests, as multi-year RPM rates him as the #21 player in the NBA. It is plausible that he is merely the 30th-60th most valuable player, but that is nevertheless very good:

–He can rebound and defend multiple positions well
–He moves the ball and avoids mistakes, with an excellent 1.8 assist:TOV ratio during his Boston career
–He has developed into a good shooter and is an efficient shot maker from 2, 3, and FT
–Advanced stats have ALWAYS suggested he is wildly underrated– from his college career to the draft to his Maverick days. It’s not like his RPM is a recent fluke.

Crowder’s sole weakness is that he cannot create a high volume of offense, so his strengths are less perceptible to casual fans. And while he is not a franchise centerpiece, the teams involved already have the necessary centerpieces.

When you factor in that he is wildly underpaid at $7M/year over the next 3 years, when he should be making $20M+, he is the ultimate asset for a contender. He fits perfectly within a star cast while tying up minimal payroll and flexibility.

Even if he comes in a less sexy mold, Crowder is similarly valuable to a contender as Kyrie Irving. And he will cost slightly more than a quarter of the price over the next 3 years. In this vein, his less attractive mold is more of a feature than a bug.

IT and Crowder on their own for Kyrie would be a bad trade for the Celtics and a good trade for Cleveland.

But Wait, There’s More!

The Celtics also gave up the Nets’ 2018 first round pick! There are ways to look at this as selling high on the pick. It is plausible that the Nets are much better than last year, and that this year’s draft class is much less hyped in a year by the time the draft rolls around.

A significant % of the time, this pick will fall in the #3 to #8 range and be used on a non-star.

But that is a the DOWNSIDE of the pick. High lottery picks are still valuable assets, and if it is a #1 or #2 pick and one or two of Doncic, Bagley, Ayton, or Porter performs better than expected, this suddenly is an elite asset that waffle crushes the value of Kyrie on his own.

It is more likely that the pick is merely a good asset than an elite one, but they are adding it to a deal that is already losing. Even if it was top 2 protected it would be an awful inclusion, the fact that they are selling some non-trivial % of monster upside is indefensible.

Ante Up!

Also Ante Zizic was included for some reason. He didn’t look great in summer league, but he didn’t look awful either. He looked like a late 1st round pick who may be decent or may not be, but either way he is under cheap team control for the next 4 years and is a useful flier when loads of money are tied up in three players. There was no reason for the Celtics to include him when they were already crushing all other offers against a team with no leverage, but they did.

Where Does This Leave Both Teams?

The Cavs looked like they were doomed with LeBron likely to leave, but this rejuvenates everything. Crowder gives them a ray of hope vs. Golden State this year, and the Brooklyn pick is an excellent asset that can append the run and possibly entice LeBron to stay. If I were the Cavs, I would try to line up the best trade available and tell LeBron that it will be executed if he opts in for 18-19.

Meanwhile the Celtics are left with 4 above average players for ’17-18: Kyrie, Hayward, Horford, and Smart. And none of these players are top 20 stars, so even with a great coach like Brad Stevens optimism should be tempered.

Jayson Tatum and Jaylen Brown will be 19 and 21 this year, and neither are ready to be positive players this season, nor are they guaranteed to ever be. Tatum has star potential but it is unlikely he will carry a franchise on his own, and Jaylen Brown will be fortunate to peak as an above average NBA player.

I would guess the Celtics are building for 2020-21 when Tatum is 22, Brown is 24, Hayward is 30, Kyrie is 28, Smart is 26, and Horford is off the books. LeBron will be 36 and past his prime, and the Warriors may be vulnerable by then. And frankly things *COULD* work out for them at that point, as they get a few years where the beginning of Tatum + Brown’s prime intersect with the tail end of Kyrie + Hayward’s.

But why they would want to commit to 28 year supermaxed Kyrie 3 years in advance at the cost of an inferior current product, a possibly elite pick, and extremely limited roster flexibility over the next few years is beyond me. Danny Ainge normally trades well, but he completely bungled this deal and set back the franchise while possibly saving the Cavaliers from their imminent doom.

2015 Pre-season Rookie Update: #’s 1-12

25 Sunday Oct 2015

Posted by deanondraft in NBA

≈ 14 Comments

Tags

Bobby Portis, D'angelo Russell, Emmanuel Mudiay, Jahlil Okafor, Justise Winslow, Karl Towns, Kelly Oubre, Kristaps Porzingis, Mario Hezonja, Myles Turner, Stanley Johnson, Willie Cauley-Stein

Star
1. Karl Towns (Final Big: 1st, Drafted: 1st)

One problem with the exercise of ranking draft prospects is that it can result in a lack of attention to a consensus #1 overall pick. After a season where 5 or 6 players could be argued to deserve the #1 pick, I have yet to see a credible argument that Towns is not the best prospect in the draft. Consequently, nobody discusses his precise level of goodness.

He’s arguably the 3rd best prospect to enter the draft post Oden/Durant. Anthony Davis is #1, and I would have taken Joel Embiid ahead of Towns before he was revealed to be an incorrigible Shirley Temple guzzler.

The next tier of prospects includes Derrick Rose, John Wall, Blake Griffin, and Kyrie Irving. Rose did not dominate college enough, and Kyrie is a non-athletic non-defense PG so I wouldn’t even consider either of them ahead of towns. Griffin and Wall both dominated college and have extreme levels of athleticism that Towns lacks, but I wouldn’t take a non-shooting non-rim protecting Griffin over a center who does both. Wall had the strongest case as an elite 2 way PG (he could have become so much better than he is), but I still favor Towns. A two way 3 point shooting center with no significant leaks in his prospect profile outside of merely good not great physical tools is just too attractive to pass up.

Of course Towns had to get drafted to the team with the most pre-historic NBA offense, and consequently he has a mere 2 attempts from 3 in the pre-season as the front office is paying Kevin Garnett $17M to mentor Towns to take jumpers with his heels on the arc. So perhaps like Wall his potential will never be fully realized, but I nevertheless rate him as the 3rd best prospect in the last 8 drafts. He should be awesome in spite of his un-sharp environment.

Good Prospects Who Are Significantly Inferior to KAT
2. Justise Winslow (Final Big: 3rd, Drafted: 10th)

Winslow has been a passing machine in the pre-season, tallying 20 assists vs 10 turnovers. This is largely due to his inability to score, as he struggled to put the biscuit in the basket from all parts of the court this pre-season. He has the ability to create quality shots for himself, but it doesn’t show in his pre-season stats as he averaged a meager 8 pts per 36 minutes.

After shooting just 25/93 (27%) on non-rim 2’s in college, Winslow only converted 2/17 of two pointers 5+ feet from the rim in the pre-season. It seems unfathomable that he can continue to be this bad from short and mid-range, but it’s nevertheless concerning if the trend continues to hold. For now, Winslow is leaning heavily on rim attempts and free throws to get his buckets.

It’s possible that he’s a career eFG% disaster if he can’t convert non-layups. But I stand by my pre-draft assessment that he is awesome at everything other than shooting. He is only 19, and he has time to learn to score away from the hoop. If he does and develops his slashing ability, he has star potential. If he doesn’t he may fall well short of the lofty praise I heaped on him pre-draft. This is a weak #2 ranking, as Justise’s scoring concerns are real and he is closer to #10 than he is to #1.

3. Stanley Johnson (Final Big: 7th, Drafted: 8th)
4. D’Angelo Russell (Final Big: 2nd, Drafted: 2nd)

This may feel like an overreaction to pre-season and summer league, but the only reason Russell ever rated ahead of Stanley is because of a not large 35 game NCAA sample. Stanley was the #3 RSCI recruit vs. Russell’s #16, and statistically the two weren’t THAT far apart. They both had questionable athleticism and questionable splits vs. good defenses, and after summer league and pre-season Russell’s concerns are much more glaring.

After a dismal summer league where Russell posted 16 assists vs 26 turnovers, he cut the turnovers in the pre-season but offered little outside of a few mid-range jumpers made off the dribble and an 11 assist game vs. Maccabi Haifa. And it’s not encouraging that he landed with one of the worst coaches surrounded by chuckers in the backcourt, which is a terrible scenario for his development. This is not enough to cast aside his excellent skill level and vision, but my optimism is tempered.

On the other hand, Johnson quelled concerns about rim finishing concerns when he converted an awesome 25/40 inside the arc in summer league. He also showed an improved handle, as he was able to slash through the defense to create layups for himself on multiple occasions while still posting more assists (10) than TOVs (9). His pre-season 2P% was mildly disappointing at 42% (28/67), and he still looks a bit clumsy with the ball so minor concerns linger. But he finished rim attempts efficiently, and only struggled to make short-mid range 2’s as he converted just 11/41 of 2PA that were 5+ feet from the rim according to ESPN shot charts. He excelled at these shots in college and pre-season, so this is likely attributable to bad variance.

Johnson is so solidly good across the board at such a young age that it’s hard to envision him amounting to not much. He doesn’t specialize in any one skill, but being average or better across the board can sum up to a valuable player to give him sneaky upside. After resisting all NCAA season, I’m finally ready to hop on board with the Stanimal. He’s the most likely non-Towns prospect to become an above average player.

5. Mario Hezonja (Final Big: 11th, Drafted: 5th)

I wasn’t high on Hezonja entering the draft, but that’s mostly because I was too lazy to scout him and chalked him up as a mystery box. There’s a lot to like here:

-He’s the most explosive player in the draft class
-He has good size at 6’8″
-He is a good 3 point shooter and bombs away with decent volume.
-He is a willing passer
-He has good shot selection and better feel for the game than you’d expect

The only holes in his game is that his handle is somewhat limited and he is bizarrely turnover prone. But I don’t see any clear reason why his turnovers won’t be cut, and his handle is good enough to do this.

To the masses he has become a caricature of overconfidence, as his swagger has overshadowed his play. So while he has solidified himself as a source of entertainment, nobody seems to be predicting greatness. It’s hard to read his quotes and expect a good team player. But in summer league 31 of his 66 FGA have come from 3, and he converted 51% (18/35) of his 2PA. His shot selection seems generally good, and this is supported by his ACB and Euro stats. He hasn’t been perfect, as he did drain the shot clock to skip the 2 for 1 and take a long 2 off the dribble. But overall there were many more good attempts than awful ones.

It cannot be taken for granted that team player Mario will continue to show up over the course of his NBA career. It’s possible that once he is on track to greatness, his stubbornness causes him to regress to poor habits. But if he stays on track, he can be anywhere from an efficient 3 + D piece to a full fledged star. His personality risks are well worth bearing given his upside. There’s an argument that he belongs even higher, and he could easily close the season as the #2 rookie in the class.

6. Willie Cauley-Stein (Final Big: 6th, Drafted: 6th)

With all of the negative pre-draft reports and him landing on one of the most incompetent NBA franchises, there is a natural aversion to WCS loving. But this is the same league where Clint Capela inexplicably slid to 26th overall in 2014, and the Kings may have made a decent pick in spite of being themselves.

WCS quietly had a good pre-season and SL, and possibly earned himself a starting role. Offensively he is limited but he is a solid garbageman who avoids mistakes as he posted a microscopic 0.85 TOVs per 36 in 253 SL + PS minutes. Defensively he isn’t perfect, but he has good instincts poking away passes and his size, athleticism, and superhuman quickness gives him upside.

It’s hard to envision him not becoming a useful NBA player, and a Tyson Chandler-ish upside isn’t bad.

7. Kelly Oubre (Final Big: 8th, Drafted: 15th)

Oubre struggled to make 3’s shooting 8/32 in SL and 1/14 pre-season, but I suspect this is largely poor variance since there weren’t questions about his shot entering the draft. More importantly, he showed a better than expected slashing ability (especially in summer league), which is exciting for a player with his awesome tools. He also posted a monster free throw rate, continued to rack up huge steal totals with his excellent length and quickness, and kept his turnover total reasonably low.

He still needs to improve his passing ability, as his assist rate did not improve from his disappointing NCAA rate. And he needs to prove that he has the feel for the game to score and defend at the NBA level. These deficiencies are why he slid to 15th overall, and they could preclude him from becoming a good NBA’er. But his tools and overall statistical production are both good enough such that they could easily trump his flaws in the long run.

Wings with Oubre’s tools who can do a little bit of everything don’t come around often, and he was a great gamble for Washington at 15th overall.

8. Jahlil Okafor (Final Big: 4th, Drafted: 3rd)

Okafor was awful in both summer league and pre-season. His value is largely entirely tied into his ability to finish at the rim with his excellent length and touch, but in the pre-season he struggled to create attempts and has instead settled for mid-range shots. Consequently he shot 38.6 FG% (22/57) and drew a mere 9 FTA. He also had a terrible 4 assists vs 18 turnovers, as he did not display passing ability to offset his plummet in scoring efficiency.

Some blame can be placed on Philly’s poor guard play and spacing, and he still can become an efficient offensive weapon if he finds a way to get a higher volume shots at the rim. But thus far he has been a black hole of extreme inefficiency, and efficient scoring was his only real strength entering the draft. This is especially scary considering his poor shooting and lackluster defense, as his offense needs to translate to the NBA exceptionally well for him to have any compelling upside scenario.

I felt I gave Okafor the benefit of the doubt by ranking him 4th in the class, and now that all of his translation flags are glaring it is hard to feel optimistic. How excited would you be if your favorite team drafted a one trick pony who may not be able to translate his one trick to the NBA level?

9. Emmanuel Mudiay (Final Big: 5th, Drafted: 7th)

A number of intelligent people think highly of Mudiay, as he has great tools and legitimate PG skills. But he still has a long road to go to become a good NBA player, and it starts with his shooting. Combining SL, PS, China, and high school all-star games he has shot 28% (22/79) from 3 and 58% (55/95) FT. It’s hard to project his shot confidently from a mish mash of small samples, but it looks bad.

There’s a short list of PG’s since 2000 who have been successful with a FT% < 70%: it’s mostly a bunch of Rondo seasons and a smattering of young Baron Davis and Tony Parker before they graduated to consistent 70%+ shooting. This is for good reason– a point guard that runs frequent pick and rolls is inevitably going to pull up for jumpers and floaters, and an inability to convert will tank his efficiency. Even Rondo was a respectable 40% career shooter from 16-23 feet. If Mudiay doesn’t learn to shoot, the rest of his game needs to be pristine to become a good starting PG

In PS + SL, Mudiay’s rebounds, steals, and blocks totals were all decent but unspectacular. He was given a large role offensively and permitted to take his lumps, and lumpy it was. He barely posted more assists (50) than TOVs (44) and his scoring was hyper-inefficient. There is clear room for improvement as he trims the fat, but there sure is lots of fat to trim. While he has potential on defense, he doesn’t have the best fundamentals and it’s unlikely that he becomes lockdown while shouldering such a big offensive load. And even though he’s athletic, he’s not on Westbrook, Wall, or Rose’s level of explosiveness. Perhaps his handle, passing, vision, and tools are enough to muster a respectable career as a non-shooting PG, but I don’t see how he is amazing enough to buck historical trends and become anything near a star without learning to shoot.

He is young enough to have a chance of developing into a respectable shooter, and this is largely where all of his upside lies. But he will almost certainly never become an above average shooter. Even if progression slightly below average shooting is guaranteed, he still has a long way to go to develop the rest of his game into a star. I see his upside as John Wall-ish, and a number of things need to go right for this to be achieved. It’s a good upside, but it’s not great and it’s dragged down by a boatload of bust equity.

Stretch 5’s
10. Bobby Portis (Final Big: 14th, Drafted: 22nd)

Portis is in a different vein from Porzingis and Turner, as he is slightly undersized for a center and not explosive enough to be a prolific shot blocker. But his mobility, high basketball IQ, and non-stop motor make him ideal for a defense that switches heavily. Given questions regarding Porzingis’s instincts and rebounding and Turner’s ability to defend the pick and roll, it wouldn’t be shocking if Portis ended up as the best defensive player of the trio.

It was a stretch to call Portis a stretch big entering the draft, with just 8% of his college FGA coming behind the arc. But playing for 3 point happy Fred Hoiberg, Portis increased his 3PA rate to 15% in his combined PS + SL sample in spite of the greater distance. It is too soon to tell how reliably he will make these, but merely attempting them is a good sign.

His biggest flaw remains his lack of explosiveness. Consequently he struggles to finish in traffic, and his 43% preseason 2P% is not inspiring. But he gets most of his shots in the flow of the offense, which keeps his turnover rate low. He also posted monster rebound numbers, and overall he had a reasonably efficient pre-season on above average usage.

Halfway through his freshman season, I wrote about the curious lack of draft hype for Portis. Some level of skepticism made sense, as his lack of burst is a genuine damper on his upside. But he is also overlooked due to lacking sex appeal in his game (i.e. a turnaround jumpshot) that he doesn’t need to be effective. His edge lies in size, mobility, effort, smarts, rebounding, shotmaking ability, and fitting in well with the team concept. It is not certain that this will sum to much, but it looks like it will amount to something. And based on pre-season something could be more than most are expecting.

11. Kristaps Porzingis (Final Big: 12th, Drafted: 4th)
12. Myles Turner (Final Big: 20th, Drafted: 11th)

Has anybody noticed that Porzingis and Turner are nearly the exact same thing? Both are awkward bigs who offer shot blocking, shooting (including turnarounds!), and not much else.

Porzingis’s hype train is comical. Knick fans are so starved for any ray of hope that every minutely positive Staps play gets blown out of proportion as if he just cured cancer. There are things to like– he is a giant with decent mobility, and is comfortable operating behind the arc with 22% of his PS + SL FGA coming from 3. He also posted more cumulative assists (13) than turnovers (11) in spite of being flagged for a poor ratio in Europe, so his feel for the game may not be that bad after all.

The downside is that he is not Dirk. Not even close. As expected for a 7’2″ player, he is neither fluid nor coordinated. This doesn’t mean he will be bad on offense, as he spaces the floor and his quickness comes in handy when he gets a clear lane against a mismatch. And if he continues to move the ball and limit turnovers, that’s a nice offensive piece for a rim protecting giant. But his value could be diminished if the Knicks expect him to create regularly. He doesn’t have the fluidity or burst to regularly attack off the dribble with efficiency and his shot isn’t good enough to score efficiently on regular mid-range attempts.

Defensively is where Staps has the most potential, as his size and length enables him to protect the rim, and his mobility enables him to defend the pick and roll and hold his own on switches. But he is nevertheless difficult to project on this end as his lackluster instincts may prevent him from becoming a great defensive piece. Also his poor rebounding detracts from his strengths on this end and puts pressure on the PF to pick up his slack on the glass.

Staps has an interesting blend of forces working in his favor opposed by flaws working against him. In the best case he becomes a quality 3 + D center who can also exploit offensive mismatches, and in the worst case he becomes a black hole on offense who never becomes a positive defensively in spite of his physical advantages. He definitely has some compelling upside, but his upside is vastly overstated by ESPN/NYC and he has clear bust risk. Also he is the type of player who could get a big boost from coaching, so it is unfortunate that he was drafted to the Knicks.

Turner lacks confidence in his NBA 3 pointer, as just 7 of his 76 SL + PS FGA came beyond the arc. Larry Bird said that Turner might be the best shooter on the team, and this is supported by his 84% college FT’s. But his 27.4 NCAA 3P% along with his scarce 3PA rate in the NBA bodes ill for the current state of his shooting range. He has a nice turnaround mid-range jumper, but he loves it so much he may as well marry it. 28 of his 37 pre-season FGA came on non-rim 2PA, and 22 came on 2PA that were 11+ feet from the hoop. In a related story, he posted a putrid 43.3% TS. This figure suffers from poor shooting variance, but it is nevertheless challenging to score efficiently with such an extreme rate of mid-range attempts. Extending his range beyond the arc and displacing a portion of mid-range attempts with 3 pointers would do a world of good for Turner’s value.

The upside is that Turner rebounds reasonably well and he blocks shots at an insane rate. There are questions about his ability to defend the pick and roll given his poor lateral quickness, and he isn’t fit for a defense that heavily switches. But Frank Vogel has already built an elite defense with an immobile big swatting away shots at the rim, so Indiana is a great landing spot for Turner to thrive on D.

2015 Pre-season Rookie Update: #’s 13-40

25 Sunday Oct 2015

Posted by deanondraft in NBA, Scouting Reports

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Cameron PAyne, Devin Booker, Frank Kaminsky, jordan mickey, Norman Powell, rashad vaughn, rj hunter, Rondae Hollis-Jefferson, Sam Dekker, terry rozier, Trey Lyles, Tyus Jones

13. Rondae Hollis-Jefferson (Final Big: 9th, Drafted: 23rd)

RHJ has the best overall tools of any wing in the draft, as he boasts elite athleticism with a 7’2″ wingspan and elite frame. As expected, he badly struggled offensively in SL and pre-season as he’s nowhere near an NBA 3 point threat and doesn’t have the handle to do much off the dribble. After shooting 5/21 from 3 in summer league, he didn’t attempt a single 3 in 85 pre-season minutes, which is a bad sign.

His strengths stood out as much as his weaknesses though: he racked up loads of steals, blocks, and rebounds while posting slightly more assists (27) than turnovers (25) in the combined summer league and pre-season sample. He’s such an elite and versatile defensive player he has awesome upside if he somehow develops a 3 point shot. As it is, he looks like he will be an MKG type with less inside the arc scoring. He has a long way to go to fit in offensively, and Brooklyn is not the sharpest team to put him in a position to succeed on that end.

His tools and defense are so outlier good I remain fond of him. Any level of passable offense can make him a highly useful NBA player.

14. Devin Booker (Final Big: 22nd, Drafted: 13th)

Booker is a weird player to evaluate. He’s one of the youngest players in the draft and could become one of the most accurate shooters in NBA history. But he has not gotten off a huge volume of 3PA in college, SL, or pre-season. He has short arms and his trigger isn’t the fastest, so his volume of 3PA may always be light.

The most interesting comparison for Booker is Arron Afflalo, as they share similar surprisingly low output in 3PA rate, rebounds, steals, and blocks. Booker is a superior draft prospect to Afflalo, and a rich man’s Afflalo is obviously a useful player. It’s just not teeming with upside, and Booker needs to find his calling card to exceed that.

Booker has a surprisingly decent handle, moves reasonably well, and is super young (doesn’t turn 19 until Oct 30) so he has potential to develop a much more diverse and efficient offensive repertoire than Afflalo. Phoenix’s hope is that if he works diligently, he has a sliver of equity to become a Ray Allen or Reggie Miller type down the road. It seems like a long shot since he is currently so far away, but it cannot be completely ruled out since time is on Booker’s side.

15. Frank Kaminsky (Final Big: 10th, Drafted: 9th)

Frank the Tank had a disappointing pre-season, converting just 34% of his 2PA (13/38). This follows a decent but unspectacular 46% (21/46) in summer league. His most common comparison of Kelly Olynyk dominated both samples shooting 67% in SL (34/51) and 57% PS (28/49) as a rookie. These small samples do not mean that Kaminsky cannot be as good or better than Olynyk, but it dims his upside as he should be held to a higher standard than his younger, rawer, and more athletic peers.

16. Sam Dekker (Final Big: 19th, Drafted: 18th)

Dekker struggled to make outside shots in his 148 pre-season minutes, but otherwise performed decently. He should be a nice fit in Houston, as he can play both SF/PF and pairs well with both Howard and Capela as a stretch 4. Also, being surrounded by shooters should help his slashing game as he has the athleticism to get to the rim and the size to finish.

Dekker’s parallels to Chandler Parsons are hard to ignore, as they have similar size and college shooting %’s (Dekker: 59%/35%/70% two/three/FT vs Parsons 58%/34%/61%). The key advantage for Parsons is his PG skills, as he had more advanced handles and a much higher NCAA assist rate. But Dekker is a bit more athletic, and if he develops into a reliable NBA 3 point shooter like Parsons he could become a decent offensive weapon in his own rite.

17. Trey Lyles (Final Big: 15th, Drafted: 12th)

Lyles showed some positive signs pre-season (14/29 2PA and 6 AST vs. 4 TOV), but he struggled in his larger summer league sample and was dragged down by his inability to make 3’s in both samples. After shooting 4/29 from 3 in college, he made just 6/27 in pre-season and summer league and needs significant improvement to justify his lottery selection.

In the instance that Lyles does become an adequate 3 point shooter, he’s an interesting piece. He has a nice first step and handle, and a stretch 4 who can also slash from the perimeter is an intriguing piece. But since he’s not that explosive, he often pulls up for floaters when his drives get cut short. He has good offensive upside, but he still needs a fair amount of polish on that end for a player who will likely be a defensive liability.

18. Cameron Payne (Final Big: 23rd, Drafted: 14th)
19. Tyus Jones (Final Big: 17th, Drafted: 24th)

In the high skill low tools PG category, I could never reconcile how Payne’s stock rose so much higher than Jones. Jones was the #4 RSCI recruit, he won MOP of the final 4, and almost every stat model rated him higher than Payne. Yet Payne went 14th to a team that normally drafts well, and Jones was passed on by a number of good GM’s as he slid all the way to 24th. Payne has slightly better physical tools with 2 inches great length and superior quickness, but he still doesn’t have the body or burst of a prototypical NBA PG.

I believe Payne vaulted ahead of Jones simply because he stylistically looks more impressive. He has a better handle and has more shake to overcome his lack of burst. He can also make a number of difficult shots of the dribble from pull-ups between pull ups, stepbacks, and floaters. Payne also plays with a swagger that is intoxicating to watch when he is running well. In contrast, Jones is more of a steady hand guiding an offense that surrounded him with elite talent. Stylistically he was much more boring, as he thrived off of avoiding mistakes and making open shots.

On one hand, Payne has a bit more meat in his game to build around as a primary ball handler, so his advanced standing may be justified. On the other hand, Jones is 1 year 9 months younger and has time to catch up, and it is possible that Payne earned more attention simply because he has a fun factor to his game that will not translate into NBA success. I am not sure which side of the argument is truer, and neither player received enough playing time in pre-season to shed much light on the subject. This comparison will be interesting to re-visit in a few years.

20. Justin Anderson (Final Big: 18th, Drafted: 21st)

After a terrific summer league, Anderson had a horrid pre-season on the Mavericks’ depleted roster. With a lack of shot creation on the team, Anderson struggled to make 3’s (4/25) and had a poor assist to turnover ratio of 7 to 16. He gets a bit of a pass because the entire team struggled, and he does fit the 3 + D archetype rather well. He isn’t the defensive beast that Rondae Hollis-Jefferson is, but he nevertheless has good D potential and is a much easier fit into NBA offenses with his superior shooting.

21. Kevon Looney (Final Big: 13th, Drafted: 30th)

His injury means no instant gratification but rookies are terrible anyway. He should be worth the wait for the value he provides at 30th overall. His main concern is that his lack of explosiveness and ball handling prevent him from living up to his statistical adoration.

22. RJ Hunter (Final Big: 25th, Drafted: 28th)

Hunter struggled to score in pre-season, but other than that he crushed the eye test. He has a great passing ability, and played good defense for a rookie showing solid fundamentals and using his length to create a whopping 11 steals in 132 pre-season minutes. He racked up impressive steal and block totals playing in Georgia Stat’s zone defense, and it’s encouraging that he has transitioned nicely to man to man at a higher level. Hunter should have a career in the NBA as a prototypical 3 + D wing, and could end up finding rotation minutes as a rookie for the Celtics.

23. Jordan Mickey (Final Big: 38th, Drafted: 33rd)

Mickey has been one of the biggest surprises of the pre-season, leading all rookies in PER. Granted, his 68 minutes largely came against garbage units of the Knicks, 76ers, Nets, and foreign teams, but he looked good and earned praise from Brad Stevens.

Mickey is one of the funkier prospects in the draft– he has excellent quickness, athleticism, and length, and is a good shot blocker. He is extremely versatile and has loads of defensive upside in a scheme that switches heavily.

His problem is that at 6’8″ he lacks height to play center, and he lacks the passing ability and shooting range to play PF. He didn’t show much promise in these areas with 6 assists and 1 3PA in 293 combined minutes between summer league and pre-season. But he did show potential as a pick and roll finisher with surprisingly smooth footwork and finishing, and he also has a respectable mid-range shot. Consequently he scored with better volume and efficiency than expected in both summer league and pre-season.

Given trends toward smaller lineups and heavy switching, perhaps he can be a great defensive center in spite of his height. His other tools help compensate, and there aren’t many centers who can really punish shorter matchups. His lack of passing and range inhibit his offensive upside and ability to fit in a wide range of lineups, but his strengths are unique and strong enough to overcome his warts. Pair him with a PF like Kelly Olynyk and give him a coach like Brad Stevens and his impact could be surprisingly good. I didn’t think much of him before the draft, but he is quickly winning me over as a second round steal.

24. Jerian Grant (Final Big: 21st, Drafted: 19th)
25. Delon Wright (Final Big: 16th, Drafted: 20th)

As the oldest players drafted in round 1, these players have more pressure to contribute immediately to maintain their value as prospects. Grant was mediocre and Wright was bad, playing a meager 72 minutes while posting more turnovers (8) than assists (7) or 2 pointers made (7).

I liked both pre-draft, but with so many younger players outperforming them they get ticked down a few slots.

26. Terry Rozier (Final Big: 50th, Drafted: 16th)

Rozier is an undersized SG who atones with good length and athleticism to be a pesky defender at both guard positions. He doesn’t have much in the way of PG skills, but he has been more than competent making 3’s at 46% (18/39) between SL and PS. In other words, he’s roughly an Avery Bradley doppelgänger which makes him a puzzling selection at 16th overall.

Danny Ainge gambled on him working hard enough to leverage his great first step into shades of a real slashing game, giving him theoretically high upside. His first step enables him to get past his man, but he doesn’t have the handle or shake to consistently get past the help defense and he often pulls up for mid-range shots when his drive gets cut short. Incidentally his efficiency suffers, as he shot just 33% inside the arc in SL (19/58) and 43% in a smaller pre-season sample (9/21).

This sets him behind Avery Bradley, as he may match Bradley’s mid-range volume at a much lower efficiency. A less efficient Bradley is not a useful player, so Rozier needs to drastically reduce his pull-up attempts and increase his layups to become a more useful player. In theory this is possible, but he looks very unnatural navigating through the teeth of a defense for a 21 year old. It’s hard to envision a good work ethic being enough to turn this weakness into a strength.

I can see Rozier having a decent career in the league, but I just don’t see the upside to merit a 16th overall selection.

27. Norman Powell (Final Big: 33rd, Drafted: 46th)

I rated Norman Powell as one of my top 2nd round sleepers before the draft, and he justified that rating with a great summer league and pre-season. He is a freak athlete with long arms who can get to the rim and play defense. If he ever develops an NBA 3 point shot he’ll be a big time steal.

28. Nikola Milutinov (Final Big: 28th, Drafted: 27th)

I still haven’t seen him play, but the Spurs drafted him– how bad could he be?

29. Larry Nance (Final Big: 32nd, Drafted: 27th)

I’m one of the few people who had him as acceptable value in the late first round, and this is why.

30. Josh Richardson (Final Big: 30th, Drafted: 40th)

I pegged Richardson as a 2nd round sleeper based on his defense, and he was a steal and blocks machine in SL/PS. He’s not much of a scorer, but he moves the ball and if he learns to make NBA 3’s he will have a career as a rotation player.

31. Chris McCullough (Final Big: 27th, Drafted: 29th)

This guy hasn’t played in forever bc of a torn ACL but he was a 5 star recruit who got loads of stocks as a freshman so let’s not forget him.

32. Rashad Vaughn (Final Big: 26th, Drafted: 17th)

The Good: He is super young and can get buckets.

The Bad: He doesn’t do anything else. In 139 pre-season minutes tallied just 9 rebs, 6 assists, 0 steals, and 0 blocks.

His tools are pedestrian with a 6’7″ wingspan and not great athleticism, so it’s hard to get too excited about his one dimensional scoring.

33. Jarell Martin (Final Big: 34th, Drafted: 25th)

Martin missed the entire pre-season with a broken foot. He didn’t seem like a great value at 25th overall to begin with, so it’s hard to feel excited for him. He is athletic and his LSU teammate Jordan Mickey looked better in an NBA system, so maybe Martin translates better than expected too.

34. Montrezl Harrell (Final Big: 36th, Drafted: 32nd)

Harrell was an effective garbage man in SL and pre-season, I’m just not sure how much it matters. He only attempted 1 three in spite of wearing a Houston uniform, and he doesn’t have the defensive aptitude to play center. I don’t see how he he fits next to Howard or Capela, so this was a semi-odd pick to me. I suppose Morey just decided to draft his top player and sort out the details later.

35. Richaun Holmes (Final Big: 37th, Drafted: 37th)
36. Pat Connaughton (Final Big: 44th, Drafted: 41st)
37. Cedi Osman (Final Big: 48th, Drafted: 31st)
38. Arturas Gudaitis (Final Big: N/A, Drafted: 47th)
39. Christian Wood (Final Big: 25th, Drafted: undrafted)
40. Branden Dawson (Final Big: 27th, Drafted: 56th)

Here are some guys to round out the top 40 since 34 is a weird amount of prospects to rank. Christian Wood might make the 76ers’ roster to the delight of draft nerds, as bad interviews caused him to go undrafted in spite of a profile that made him a clear 1st rounder.

Making Sense Of Statistical Models And The Celtics

02 Friday Oct 2015

Posted by deanondraft in NBA

≈ 10 Comments

Tags

Brad Stevens, Marcus Smart

The Boston Celtics’ 2015-2016 season expectations has been a point of contention between qualitative and quantitative fans. Many subjective fans are estimating that they will hover around .500 and battle for the 8 seed in the East. On the other hand, quant models are projecting the Celtics to flirt with the 2 seed in the East. Let’s explore both sides of the argument.

Why the Celtics Might Be Stuck In Neutral:

The Celtics won 40 games last year, but they so handily overachieved that perhaps their success was in part due to luck. Amir Johnson is a nice role player, and Marcus Smart should be better, but the team still lacks the star to take them to the next level. Amir does not have the athleticism that he did in his prime, and Smart does not have the burst or handle to become a stud scorer. While the roster is generally young, it lacks standout athletes and it is fair to expect whatever slight progressions made to simply overcome the regression to the mean. After all, it is commonly doubted that the Celtics have a single above average starter.

Vegas’s Westgate tends to agree with this narrative, as they set the Celtics’ regular season win total o/u at 42.5.

Why the Celtics Might Be Poised For a Leap

First, let’s look at the key returning pieces and their bb-ref ages from last season:

Player	Minutes	Age
Avery Bradley	2428	24
Evan Turner	2260	26
Marcus Smart	1808	20
Tyler Zeller	1731	25
Jared Sullinger	1566	22
Kelly Olynyk	1423	23
Jae Crowder	1382	24
Isaiah Thomas	545	25
Jonas Jerebko	527	27

The average minute weighted age of this group is 23.8. Suffice it to say that all key returning pieces are more likely to improve than they are to regress. This also applies to their 38 year old coach, as Stevens is likely still improving as he enters his 3rd NBA season.

The piece with most growth potential is Smart. He does not appear on track to become an offensive star, and I do not anticipate that he will suddenly be able to run an efficient NBA offense at age 21. But he did have an outlier good defensive season for a rookie (as predicted by yours truly), and a healthy leap forward on defense complemented by mild to medium offensive improvements is plausible. RPM rated him as the top rookie last season, and a moderate sophomore leap will make him a solidly good player.

Key departed players:

Player	Minutes
Brandon Bass	1929
Jeff Green	1093
Rajon Rondo	699

Rondo and Green were widely presumed to be the Celtics’ best players among casual fans entering last season, until Boston became better after dealing them and their respective new teams got worse. Their level of harmfulness to the Celtics can be disputed, but at worst the Celtics shed almost 1800 slightly bad minutes that will be comfortably upgraded this season.

That leaves Brandon Bass as the only noteworthy loss. Bass is a perfectly decent rotation player, but he is slightly undersized as a PF and is neither a rim protector nor floor spacer. There is no argument subjective or quantitative that he will be missed, as consensus is that his replacement Amir Johnson will be a clear upgrade.

Johnson has long been a darling of advanced stats. His bad ankles have caused his athleticism to wane, but at age 28 he still has enough left to contend for most valuable player on the Celtics. Here are his early blurbs from training camp (as per Rotoworld)

9/27:
Celtics head coach Brad Stevens said that Amir Johnson looked “terrific” during his first practice with Boston.

9/28:
Amir Johnson has shined on defense in practice so far.

9/30:
Celtics head coach Brad Stevens praised Amir Johnson for his defense again on Tuesday:

“First of all, he’s 6-9, he’s long, he’s athletic,” Stevens said. “But then I think there’s not a lot of people like that generally, but there’s a lot of people like that in this league. But his mind is excellent for defense and he really prioritizes it. And then his motor is extremely high. So I think that all that factored in is why he’s separated himself as helping your team win when he’s on the defensive end of the floor.”

Stevens’s instant adoration for Amir is a solid checkmark in favor of the verity of advanced stats painting him in a favorable light. He is in decline due to his ankles, but he gets a boost by transitioning from an average coach to an elite one and should seamlessly fit into any Celtics lineup.

The Celtics also get a full season of availability from two of their more important players in Jae Crowder and especially Isaiah Thomas. Crowder has impressed at least one basketball expert:

‏@haralabob

Mavs also gave up a really good player in Crowder. Great defender and has developed into a decent offensive player.

Haralabos is one of the few NBA fans who works to precisely discern the value of players, and he has become a millionaire by succeeding at this. Like Smart and Johnson, Crowder is piece underrated by the masses as his value stems from defense and intelligence to avoid mistakes offensively. Having him for a full season where he possibly starts and displaces lost Jeff Green minutes will certainly be healthy for Boston.

Isaiah Thomas can nearly be treated as a new acquisition, as he only played in 21 games for the Celtics and averaged 26 minutes per game coming off the bench. He gave the roster of one way perimeter defense studs a sorely needed ball handler, and led the team in a myriad of advanced stats as he played a huge role on offense and did so efficiently. Here’s the split from Isaiah Thomas’s first appearance in a Celtics uniform. Note that PD = point differential:

Sample	W	L	PD
Pre-Zeke	20	32	-1.6
Zeke	20	10	3.2

The +3.2 PD during the Thomas era puts them right at a 50 win expectancy over a full season. And he only played 37.5% of possible minutes over this stretch as he missed 9 games.

The +3.2 was likely unsustainable over 82 games, as Thomas is not LeBron James and the prior 52 games cannot be entirely neglected. But given that Thomas and Crowder are better than Rondo and Green (small sample support: units with IT and Jae were +7.4 per 48 in 440 mins, Rondo and JG were -2.2 in 568 mins together), it intuitively makes sense to give less weight toward the earlier sample. It follows that the end year Celtics were likely better than their 40 win bottom line (41.4 wins derived from PD).

This is all one sided arguing in favor of the Celtics being better, so let’s discuss why they might be worse. It is not clear that any of their young guards among James Young, Terry Rozier, or RJ Hunter will be above replacement level, so the Celtics may be unable to stomach serious backcourt injury issues without trading for a guard.

The other risk is that new acquisition David Lee is a clear downgrade from the other 5 bigs on the roster. If he carves out a significant rotation role, this could harm the Celtics’ team output. But other than that, the Celtics are clearly trending in the positive direction.

Conclusion

People are not hardwired to intuitively assess the precise impact of each player and coach, let alone the summation of these over a full 82 game season riddled with variance. Most fans tend to overrate scoring, underrate defense, and have a skewed perception of what constitutes a valuable player. Thus it is easy to describe the Celtics as a team with “no above average starters” and resonate with casual fans, but there is no substantial evidence to support this claim. Even if the claim is humored and the Celtics only have 5 average starters and a good bench, why is it difficult to believe that Brad Stevens can elevate such a roster to 48-50 wins in the East?

Stat models like the Celtics because the team is loaded with subtle edges in their favor. Every key data point suggests improvement, and there is little to no clear force pushing the Celtics in the negative direction. While basketball stats have their limitations, they have the advantage of objectivity and freedom from cognitive biases.

On the other hand, the subjective arguments against the Celtics are entirely founded on cognitive biases since they center around lack of perceived star power. It would be compelling to make a case that last year’s playoff appearance was heavily fueled by luck, that the Celtics’ advanced stat stars have holes in their game that stats fail to capture, or that the pieces on the roster will fail to mesh. But a central argument that the roster looks underwhelming to your unscientific eye is the level of approach that caused the masses to initially believe the Celtics lost the Rajon Rondo trade with Dallas.

I am on #teamstats. In this instance, they present a reasonable approximation of the truth, and people who enjoy money can freely bet Boston o42.5 wins.

What In The World Is Orlando Doing?

08 Tuesday Jul 2014

Posted by deanondraft in NBA

≈ 10 Comments

Tags

Rob Hennigan

Orlando GM Rob Hennigan has executed a series of puzzling moves this offseason, and consensus opinion is that the Magic are having a poor offseason. I decided to walk through move by move to share my perception of Orlando’s plan.

Arron Afflalo Traded To Denver For Evan Fournier and pick #56 (Roy Devyn Marble) in the 2014 Draft

Afflalo is owed $7.6M in 14-15 and has a $7.8M player option in 15-16 that will likely get declined. So he’s basically a $7.6M expiring with a small anti-freeroll for the Nuggets in case his value plummets in 14-15. Afflalo is underpaid at $7.6M, but for one season at that price he’s not underpaid enough to fetch a big haul.

Fournier isn’t great but he is a former 1st rounder entering the 3rd year of his rookie deal and he clearly has some value. The 2nd rounder isn’t much but I liked the Devyn Marble selection. Collectively these assets are likely worth somewhere in the $3-4M range, and I doubt that 1 season of Afflalo could have fetched more.

It’s clear that Orlando intended to draft a PG and SF and wanted to get a cheaper, younger wing to come off the bench rather than demote Afflalo and watch him walk after a season. I would say the move is neutral value-wise for Orlando and it makes sense for their intents, so I am fine with it overall.

Aaron Gordon drafted #4 overall, Eflrid Payton drafted #10 at the price of #12, 2015 Orlando 2nd, 2017 Philly 1st

Everybody expected Hennigan to take Dante Exum or Marcus Smart 4th overall, but he surprised by taking Aaron Gordon. This makes sense with the 12th pick in hand, as Elfrid Payton and/or Tyler Ennis projected to be the BPA (forgetting my Capela/Nurkic love which seems unshared by NBA GM’s). Essentially Hennigan is making a statement that the difference between Exum and Payton is smaller than the gap between say Aaron Gordon and TJ Warren. I am not sure I agree because Exum really glows with a unique upside to me, but he’s such a fuzzy prospect to peg that I can’t say for certain that Hennigan is wrong. Aaron Gordon was on my short list of 3 prospects who was in the conversation for BPA, and it’s far more important that they didn’t spew on say Julius Randle rather than taking my first choice who I’m not certain is even better than Gordon. Exum’s FIBA sample looks good, but it is completely waffle crushed by Gordon’s FIBA sample which portrays him as roughly the best prospect ever.

What I hated about Orlando’s draft was the willingness to give up all of those picks to lock in Payton. I had Ennis as slightly above him, but am not dripping with confidence in my assertion. I like both and believe it’s perfectly reasonable to prefer Payton. But at the price of a 2015 2nd rounder that will likely fall in the 30’s and a 2017 1st that is only top 11 protected (top 8 in 2018), I’d say Hennigan got tunnel vision on his guy and spewed too much value. He should have offered Hinkie much less and taken Ennis 12th if Hinkie said no.

Hennigan clearly believes that shooting is overrated in the draft (I strongly agree) and the way to go is to take toolsy defensive prospects with a good baseline of non-shooting skill (these are my type of guys too). I like his strategy and feel it’s safe to say that he’s taking a much sharper approach to prospect selection than most other GM’s. He gave some of it back by taking an unsharp approach to the Payton trade, but it’s far more damaging to draft a complete dud so I overall like Orlando’s draft.

Ben Gordon signs for 2/9, Willie Green claimed off waivers

Along with the rest of the world, I do not understand these moves. The Magic are burning roster spots and cap space on washed up veterans who are at best replacement level at this stage of their careers. I really hope that Hennigan does not expect either of these guys will contribute, because that would make me deeply fear for his ability to evaluate NBA talent. It’s possible that he’s just pals with their agents and wants some vets to balance out the youth of the roster while doing his buddies a favor. I don’t know. Making sense of these moves is a futile exercise. The bottom line is that they are completely pointless and the Magic burned 2 roster spots and $6M of cap space on deadweight. They could have just taken on Lou Williams and Bebe instead by one upping John Salmons’ $1M buyout with pure cap space.

These are painfully obvious mistakes, but the good news is that they are inexpensive ones.

Channing Frye signs for 4/32
I don’t like this move. Currently Oladipo is 22, Gordon is 18, Payton is 20, Vucevic is 23, and they have another handful of bench players in their early 20’s. So they target a 31 year old free agent and give him 4 years? That doesn’t align with their window at all. Why not offer that same money to 27 year old Josh McRoberts? I’d wager the extra $9M is more attractive to him than maybe getting to play with LeBron. Not to mention that giving 4/32 deals to 31 year olds is a bad practice in general. Hennigan definitely suffered from Wizards-esque myopia with this one.

That said I do find some aspects of the deal positively redeeming. First, it reinforces the fact that Hennigan perceives Aaron Gordon as a SF which is 100% correct. Also paying up for a FA shooter is far better than drafting shooting. Shooting is overpriced in the draft and somehow undervalued in FA, and Henny seems to have at least solved this. And Orlando does badly need a stretch 4 after drafting so many guards and wings who cannot shoot. I would have loved this move if it was for the younger McRoberts. Nevertheless the Magic’s presumed starting 5 of Payton/Oladipo/Gordon/Frye/Vucevic is interesting.

The first thing people may note are that they have poor rim protection, as neither Frye nor Vucevic is a defensive stud. But their perimeter defense is potentially awesome with Payton, Oladipo, and Gordon collectively providing a ton of upside on that end. This is a great way to build around Vucevic (which is no easy task. Vucci is a weird player to build around). Having elite perimeter defense to contain penetration and force jump shots is ideal since it mitigates his rim protection limitations and maximizes his strong defensive rebounding. Frye ties everything together by spacing the floor. It’s a funky lineup to be sure, but I am a sucker for weirdness and I like the way the pieces fit.

Given that Frye has the two best traits for aging well (height and shooting), it’s possible that Orlando ends up in the playoffs by year 2 of his deal and this doesn’t prove to be the worst signing in the world.

Conclusions

Overall it’s fair to question the upside of the roster since nobody is truly a world beater. Gordon is the only player with star upside and he’s at least a few years away from getting there. And if he becomes the SF version of Josh Smith or the next MKG, the Magic don’t have the brightest future. But I still like the way the pieces fit, and Orlando’s roster situation is clearly superior to a plethora of teams.

It seems that everybody is in a rush to hate on Orlando’s offseason, but the worst thing they have done is committed obvious but inexpensive errors (Green + Gordon). It’s painful how pointless these moves are, but other teams have done such worse damage with their bad moves. Are those signings nearly as harmful as the Cavs’ recent draft decisions? Or how about the Lakers paying washed up, injured Kobe 2/48 and then trying to pair him with Melo, while also taking Julius Randle 7th and likely making a horrible coaching hire? How does it compare to the Nets’ strategy of throwing ever last dollar and draft pick at whatever old players come available?

To me, Hennigan is a middle of the road GM having a middle of the road offseason. He’s made some clear mistakes, he has shown a classic case of desperation to win too soon, but at least he is doing some things right. He is taking a clever approach to the draft and he is assembling pieces that fit together in a sensible manner. I simply can’t think of as many nice things to say about half the GM’s in the league.

This could be perceived as commentary than half of the GM’s in the league are completely under-qualified and terrible moreso than Hennigan isn’t that bad. Henny does get blown out of the water by the Buford, Hinkie, and Morey types of the world by a wider margin than be beats out the bottom feeding GM’s. Whenever he makes a good move to set the franchise forward, there will likely be a bad move around the corner to impede progress. But in a world where Phil Jackson is paid $12M/year to make directionless moves while presumably listening to Glory Days on repeat, having an inkling of sense and direction on a macro level stands out to me.

So I’m ever so gently defending Orlando’s offseason. I do so with limited enthusiasm because who knows what other -EV moves they have in store. But I believe they are getting more disdain than they deserve. At least they didn’t enlist a random collection of nerds to ignore so the owner could play GM and make the draft pick himself.

Exploring The Inefficiencies of the NBA Free Agent Market

02 Wednesday Jul 2014

Posted by deanondraft in NBA

≈ 15 Comments

Tags

Gordon Hayward, lol Ben Gordon

It’s now NBA free agent season, which means that we get to now discuss how badly teams overpay for every single player that signs other than LeBron. Nate Duncan recently made a good post about the remaining FA’s: once the stars land, there is a lot of money to be allocated to not many good players. This is how it always is, and it’s why everybody always seems so overpaid. Teams are basically filling their roster gaps by dumping whatever money they have on whoever is available, and the bang per buck is often uninspiring.

My feelings are that it is exceptionally difficult to find a worthwhile deal in the $3M-$10M AAV range. There are some situations where it makes sense, as I agree with the consensus that the Warriors signing Shaun Livingston was a good idea since they are so close to contention, and the move is especially good if it’s a prelude to a Klay Thompson for Kevin Love deal. They need somebody to fill out the backcourt minutes, and having it be Livingston instead of Steve Blake or Jordan Crawford is worth the $5.3M AAV for a team in their position.

Take the other signings: Ben Gordon 2/9 (lol), Jodie Meeks 3/19, CJ Miles 4/18, Avery Bradley 4/32, Marcin Gortat 5/60. Even forgetting the baffling Gordon signing, Meeks, Miles, Bradley, and Gortat would fill up half of a single team’s cap space without providing a world of talent. Suffice it to say that if the other half was filled with similar players, that team would lose many games the following season.

On average if you fill up a high % of your cap with mid-tier FA’s, it’s not going to result in a strong team. The Hawks seemed to somehow be incredible value hunters last offseason, as their starting playoff lineup of Teague/Korver/Carroll/Millsap/Antic nearly knocked off the Pacers in a 7 game series after costing a total of $27M of cap space on the open market. But Millsap, Korver, and Carroll were arguably the three best value signings of the offeseason, so the Hawks are an anomaly and they were still < .500 relying entirely on non-elite free agents.

I believe Danny Ainge is a good drafter, good trader, and makes good coaching hires. These are the qualities that make him an overall good GM, but he doesn’t do that well in free agency because he targets too many mid-tier players. In 2012 he spent $25M/year on 3-4 year commitments for Jason Terry, Courtney Lee, Jeff Green, and Brandon Bass. They didn’t provide a world of help, as the Celtics finished 41-40 with aging Pierce and Garnett as comfortably their top two players and the pricey signings providing limited assistance. Collectively those players wouldn’t have even formed a great 2nd unit, and they were even selected by a comfortably above average GM.

Thus far my favorite move of this offseason has been Masai Ujiri trading John Salmon’s partially guaranteed contract for Lou Williams’s expiring deal and Bebe Nogueira. Atlanta gained just $4.3M of cap space, and Toronto got an expiring who isn’t much worse than the multi-year MLE signings and a free prospect on the side. Bebe has good tools for a center and has good stats in the ACB, the toughest European league. He seemed like great value at 16th overall and he is the type of player I would love to add for a small slice of cap space. The crazy thing is that Salmons had a $1M buyout, so any team with $5.3M+ of cap space could have one upped the Raptors and taken on the same package for air. Think about this: a single season of Jodie Meeks cost $2M more than a single season of Lou Williams…and a free mid-1st rounder on the side! Further you are required to commit to Meeks for two years beyond this one, which I perceive as a clear negative. And people don’t even hate the Meeks move that much!

Unfortunately opportunities to scoop up Bebe on the cheap are few and far between, and teams have to spend their money on something. If I was a GM, I’d diligently avoid mid-tier signings unless I felt the value was stellar along the lines of the deals the Hawks found last offseason. I would try to commit as few years and as little money as possible to fill out my rotation. If I was going to commit multiple years to a player, I would strongly prefer that I be committing to his 24-28 age span rather than his 30-34 age span. And if I was going to overpay, I’d do it on the best players I could attract rather than the middling players who fit the best. The best example of that this offseason is Gordon Hayward. While he’s a RFA and the Jazz can match any offer he receives, there is some doubt as to whether he’s good enough to merit a max.

Hayward is 24 years old and in my estimation a good player. He can handle, he can pass, he can shoot, and he works well as a secondary ball handler who can space the floor and create offense for himself and others. As far as I am aware he’s a decent defensive player (I am not a serial Jazz watcher), which means that there isn’t a significant cost to getting his offense on the floor. His 13-14 stats may not be stellar, but he was asked to carry the offense for a horribly coached, tanking team. Further his 3p% fell far below his career norm in which almost assuredly is due to poor variance and/or poor offensive environment. I expect his stats to take a clear step forward next year, especially if he lands with a good coach such as Jeff Hornacek or Brad Stevens. He is already a top 50 or so player and with minor improvements for season to season he could easily be top 30 by the end of the contract. Taking up 25% of the cap at the cost of no assets is not an expensive price to pay in a league where the 5 starters and the coach are what drive almost all of each team’s success.

This becomes especially true for a team like Philadelphia. Their roster is filled with cheap rookie contracts and they need to unload a huge chunk on something. Imagine if they maxed Hayward and outbid the Pacers’ 5/44 offer for Lance Stephenson (say 4/50). Their starting 5 would be MCW/Lance/Hayward/Thad/Nerlens. If Brett Brown can coach, that team is making the playoffs in the East. Granted, they could use a genuine center to fill out the rotation, they do have this Joel Embiid guy to eventually fill that role. And because Hayward and Stephenson are so young, they should get better in lockstep with the other young players. Philly doesn’t need to tank again, they don’t need to sell off Thad. They have a million 2nd round fliers to eventually become solid bench players, and rounding out the rotation with mini-MLE and vet’s min players isn’t the worst thing in the world. If just one of Embiid or Nerlens stays healthy and becomes good, that team may become unbeatable down the line. Their defensive potential would be absolutely stellar and that’s without any of their starters having an Avery Bradley level of limited box score stats.

The same goes for a team like Boston, who is loaded with rookie contracts and future Nets’ picks as cheap value and trade currency.Hayward is great for any team transitioning from tank to respectability.

When you are micro-analyzing bench players, the difference between the 200th and 250th best player in the league may seem immense. But in reality, it negligibly impacts the bottom line. Talent is valued on an exponential curve, so the value is all packed into the top end guys. Even though Gordon Hayward at $15.8M/year seems insane compared to LeBron at $20M/year, that’s because maxes are silly and broken for the super studs. Once you constrain to what is accessible for most, what is truly insane is Jodie Meeks at $6.3M/year compared to Hayward at $15.8M.

The optimal way to fill out your bench isn’t to pay a premium for your first choice of role player, it’s to get better at identifying the best players available for cheap. Sam Hinkie has tried to build his bench by overloading on 2nd round picks. The Spurs are constantly pulling players such as Danny Green, Patty Mills, and Boris Diaw off the scrap heap and turning them into legitimately good role players. It’s fairly amazing that the team that destroyed the Heat in the finals had that many players who were available for free once upon a time on top of not having a true superstar. Today they signed undrafted free agent Bryce Cotton to a partially guaranteed 2 year deal, and I like that move much better than jumping into the MLE donation party.

The bottom line is that the NBA salary curve is broken and teams could gain an edge if they pay attention to the inefficiencies. Thus far most of the early signings have failed to do so. Even if the overpays are the standard, they remain suboptimal and I take little issue with annual declarations of fringe players being overpaid as they always are.

	deanondraft on 2023 Draft Mid-Season Boa…
	cloudsean on 2023 Draft Mid-Season Boa…
	deanondraft on Summer League Scouting: Cade…
	Nobleyute on Summer League Scouting: Cade…
	deanondraft on Should NBA Teams Worry about B…

Dean On Draft

~ NBA Draft Analysis

Category Archives: NBA

Summer League Scouting: Cade Cunningham

Draft Predictions Retrospective

Did The Celtics Overpay for Kyrie Irving?

2015 Pre-season Rookie Update: #’s 1-12

2015 Pre-season Rookie Update: #’s 13-40

Making Sense Of Statistical Models And The Celtics

What In The World Is Orlando Doing?

Exploring The Inefficiencies of the NBA Free Agent Market