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Odds and ends

The Downside of Upside

01 Wednesday Feb 2023

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Traditional NBA draft wisdom dictates that teams should place a large emphasis on prospect upside. Championship runs are typically driven by star players, and stars are rarely available in trade or free agency. The draft is the best place to gamble on star upside, so why not roll the dice and hope to get lucky on a high risk, high reward prospect over a presumed solid rotation player?

Kuminga over Franz

The best recent example of this logic failing was in 2021 when the Warriors drafted Jonathan Kuminga 7th overall over Franz Wagner. Kuminga had perceived higher upside due to his elite frame and athleticism which Franz sorely lacked. But Kuminga was coming off a mediocre season for G-League ignite, whereas Franz was elite for Michigan.

And not only was Franz elite, but he was elite in every aspect necessary for NBA success. He was the only non-top 4 prospect that I have ever perceived as unbustable. His only real concerns were he did not rack up points and rebounds at Michigan like you would expect from a traditional star wing, which seemingly limited his upside. My favorite NBA comparison for him was Otto Porter Jr.

Conversely, Kuminga had flags on flags on flags. His handle and shooting were subpar. His defensive IQ was questionable. He had questions regarding his work ethic and the company he kept. And while he was listed as one of the youngest players in the draft, there were questions about whether he was actually his listed age.

There were loads of questions marks that needed to go his way to succeed. It is like he needed 5 or 6 different coinflips to fulfill his upside, which is not great odds for a mid-lottery pick (1.5-3%).

And even then that still may only amount to a fringe all-star like Jaylen Brown. To be a top 5 MVP candidate perhaps he needed 9 or 10 successful coinflips to fulfill that upside (0.1-0.2%). It’s impossible to estimate the exact percentage odds, but this should be a basic framework for visualizing upside tails. The more question marks a player has, the more coinflips need to be parlayed for his upside to be hit.

For the sake of argument, let’s there are 9 high leverage coinflips that determine Kuminga’s outcome. 9 successful flips yield 1st team all NBA (0.2%), 8 yield Jaylen Brown (1.8%), 7 yield an average starter (7%), 6 yields an average rotation player (16%), and 5 yields fringe rotation (25%), and 4 or less is a replacement player or bust (50%).

What is particularly frustrating how much more likely middle ground outcomes which teases enough hope of potential getting fulfilled are (48%) than actually being an all-star (2%). Granted these percentages are conjecture and conceivably could be harsh– but the idea is that by parlaying too many things that need to go right for upside to hit, you are left with a poor range of outcomes.

NBA Teams Err on Side of Sunk Cost Fallacy

Andrew Wiggins disappointed in his first few NBA seasons for a #1 overall pick, but not enough to stop the Timberwolves from extending him for 5 years @ $146.5 million. Then when he continued to disappoint, they paid a 1st round pick (that was coincidentally used on Kuminga) to swap him for D’Angelo Russell. His redemption arc in Golden State ultimately made this extension not bad value for his new team, but he nevertheless signed his next extension for a more economical 4/109 in spite of a significant cap increase coming.

Phoenix recently re-signed DeAndre Ayton for 4/133, only to watch their talented but enigmatic player regress in the first season of his new deal. Atlanta traded picks #8, 17, and 35 to move up in the draft for DeAndre Hunter, and then committed 4/90 to essentially a 25 y/o replacement level player. Zion Williamson got 5/193 after playing a total of 85 games in his first 3 seasons.

NBA teams regularly fall victim to sunk cost fallacy. They will continue to invest in the upside of their prospects so long as they don’t completely bust. This makes it dangerous to gamble on upside players who need too many things to go right to fulfill their upside.

Right now Kuminga is in this zone of mediocrity where he has shown enough potential to maintain intrigue, but he may never actually be a useful NBA player. It would not be a surprise if he gets overpaid in his first major contract, and then fails to live up to the value.

But what about Giannis?

Once in a while a mystery box prospect will grow two inches, fill out from a skinny kid into an explosive tank, and make major leaps in his game every season and become Giannis. But it may be another 100+ drafts before we see another young + toolsy mystery box succeed like him. Much more commonly you end up with either a bust, or a somewhat useful but flawed player who the team continues to over-invest in.

And as great as it is to hit on a Giannis in the mid-1st, it is even better to land a Nikola Jokic in the mid-2nd. Jokic required a much less valuable pick, and based on pre-draft info he clearly had a better median outcome than Giannis.

Jokic slid a full round later than Giannis due to his perceived lack of upside in spite of having excellent performance as a teenager in the Adriatic League, while Giannis struggled in his small samples of lower Greek Divisions. Yet they have had similarly valuable NBA careers.

Given the superior cost efficiency of Jokic and that no mystery box has provided close to the value of Giannis, it is difficult to argue that pure upside swings actually offer more upside than perceived low upside players who are clearly good.

The Best Predictor of Upside is Floor

Looking back at Franz Wagner, there were such few questions marks about his game. He had been shooting 80%+ from the line since he was 15 years old. He had elite wing dimensions, excellent lateral mobility, and his defense was fundamentally near perfect. He could handle and pass and had a pristine basketball IQ. The only real question was how much offense could he create in the NBA as a 19.2 usage college player who averaged 12.5 points as a sophomore.

The answer turned out to be as good as anybody could have hoped, as he is now a 24.4 usage NBA player averaging 19.9 pts on 59.7% at 21 years old. The odds of this happening based on pre-draft info seemed fairly low, but he did show competent NCAA penetration with excellent coordination to step through defenses. In tandem with his skill level and basketball IQ, he was able to succeed at this in the NBA much better and faster than expected.

Given how awesome he was in all other aspects of the game, perhaps this should not be such a large surprise. Regardless, it is just one thing that went unexpectedly right and suddenly he is looking like a future star.

Consider all of the aforementioned points that needed to go right for a prospect like Kuminga to even become a Jaylen Brown type. After *one* point that went right for Franz, he is now rated higher than Jaylen in metrics such as EPM (+3.6 vs 2.8) and RAPTOR (+3.2 vs +0.2). Also Haralabos Voulgaris has mentioned the model he used to make millions betting on the NBA rated Franz 15th in the league.

There are other metrics that rate Brown higher, so it is not crystal clear that Franz is the better player at this time. But he is 5 years younger at age 21 vs 26, and it is only a matter of time before Franz becomes the clearly superior player.

This is the magic of having a high floor. A quality role player may only need one or two things to go right to become a star. And it is more comfortable to pay to extend a young player who is already valuable. If Franz “only” peaked as a pre-injury version of Otto Porter Jr, that would still be a great return on a mid-lottery pick. Even if he disappointed and hit my floor comp of Mikal Bridges, you’re still getting a solid guy. Nobody objected to Phoenix extending Mikal for 4/90.

Why is Floor so Commonly Underrated?

The main issue is that draft consensus is bad at estimating floor. Older prospects who simply aren’t good enough for the NBA often get the “high floor” label. Then when they bust, it makes the label seem meaningless. If high floor and high ceiling players both are capable of busting, why not just swing for the upside fences?

In reality, high floor should mean high confidence that a prospect will be a useful NBA player. And high confidence that a prospect will be a useful NBA player strongly correlates with that player having a high upside. Younger prospects will typically have higher error bars in both directions.

It’s not always a perfect correlation. There are players who have higher error bars due to being obviously talented but swing heavily based on murky shooting and defense outcomes. Scottie Barnes and Alperen Sengun are two examples of this from 2021. But they still had high floors in their own rites– Sengun has been disappointing at both shooting and defense and still appears to be a steal at 16th overall.

Bottom Line

Draft concepts such as floor and ceiling are often applied inaccurately and lead to inefficient decision making. But if one of them should be given more weight when accurately measured– it is floor.

It is difficult to trump a high confidence that a prospect will be a valuable NBA player. That way you maximize outcomes where you get positive value out of a pick, and minimize outcomes where you end up committing longterm money and a significant role on the team on a player who never provides close to the desired outcome.

And most importantly, confidence in a prospect’s ability to be valuable in the NBA is one of the best predictors of upside as well.

It can be fun to imagine “what if everything goes perfectly in this prospect’s development,” but outside of Giannis this essentially never happens. Flaws from a young age often persist through a player’s prime, at least to some non-trivial extent. It is far more efficient to focus on the likely outcomes.

Upside deserves some consideration, but not as much as it commonly receives. Much like construction of a building, the foundation of efficient draft analysis starts at the floor.

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Draft Predictions Retrospective

24 Monday Aug 2020

Posted by in Miscellaneous, NBA

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The draft is super hard to predict. Over my 6 years of blogging about the draft, I have made some good predictions and some bad ones. The predictions that sting me the most are the ones where I went too far pushing a “hot take.” The idea was nothing was at stake anyway, and if a contrarian opinion proves accurate, being more aggressive makes it look better in retrospect.

What I learned is that it’s extremely difficult to predict the next 15 years for a 19 year old kid. I have been wrong so many times, it now seems pointless to ever make any bold proclamations. It only makes my analysis less accurate, since more bold statements = more opportunities to be wrong. All I can do is look at the available information, assess the various possibilities for each prospect, and make an attempt at estimating their value.

The best thing I ever wrote questioned if Luka Doncic was the best prospect ever. The best part about the writeup is that I didn’t make any definitive statements, I merely presented facts and asked questions in an attempt to interpret it. The questions have since proved to be relevant, so I will focus on keeping that tone going forward

Anyhow, just for fun I will go back and review my year by year predictions since we have it all on record:

2014

This was my first year where I put the most effort, and also by far my best year. I was highly bearish on Jabari Parker and Andrew Wiggins as the top 2 picks.

I correctly rated Joel Embiid as the #1 overall pick, with Dante Exum, Aaron Gordon, and Marcus Smart rounding out the top 4. Some people may say Dante Exum at #2 looks bad in retrospect, but seeing that Embiid is the only real star at the top of the draft I don’t feel badly about it. I likely should have placed him at #4 below Smart and Gordon but this was a relatively minor miss for a shot at a mystery box.

I also correctly rated non-lotto bigs Jusuf Nurkic and Clint Capela above Parker + Wiggins at #5 and #6, which felt insane to do at the time yet somehow worked out.

I also had Nikola Jokic and Spencer Dinwiddie as 2nd round steals at #16 and #17 respectively.

I also had a few misses. Tyler Ennis piqued my interest but #9 was far too high for him. And while I feel I raised valid concerns about Julius Randle (#23), Zach LaVine (#35), and Rodney Hood (#57), I ranked all of them too low. But then after watching summer league, I actually noted that these were all of my opinions I felt worst about.

This was the season where I watched by far the most basketball both pre-draft and summer league, and really committed myself to understanding as much as possible. In retrospect I think my analysis was about as good as possible, and I may not ever analyze a draft this well again.

2015

This draft I gave much less effort than 2014 and it shows. I was far too low on Kristaps Porzingis (#12), Myles Turner (#20), Devin Booker (#22), and Terry Rozier (#50).

I also was sky high on Justise Winslow which hasn’t fully worked out, nor has it been a disaster. I ranked him #3 on my big board, and in the article I said I thought he was a better prospect than Jahlil Okafor and Emmanuel Mudiay which has proved to be accurate. But he also hasn’t nearly lived up to the massive potential I saw in him.

The bright side of this season was the only other player I wrote about: Josh Richardson. When he wasn’t even on the top 100 of anybody’s rankings, I wrote about how he was the hidden gem of the draft and ranked him #30.

I also had Larry Nance and Norman Powell as possible second round steals ranking them #32 and #33 respectively when they were getting relatively little attention (Nance going #27 was a big surprise). At least finding a few late steals somewhat salvaged this draft.

2016

This year was an unmitigated disaster. I had Ingram > Simmons, which is starting to look defensible, but Simmons is still the better talent and player and was the obvious #1.

I had Dragan Bender #3 which I don’t fully regret with such other few interesting options available, but I was too nevertheless too high based on a tiny sample of FIBA when he was 16.

Most notably I ranked Jamal Murray #12 and Buddy Hield #24 which is just awful considering how many terrible players I ranked ahead of them including #6 Deyonta Davis and #8 Timothe Luwawu. I was putting pretty low thought into my rankings, and in fairness I updated shortly after the draft to make all of these drastically more sane.

I did have a couple of decent ideas in the mix, with Dejounte Murray at #13 and Fred VanVleet #42 as a couple of later steals. But I don’t think this does much to salvage a bad overall ranking where I got too many things wrong.

2017

I was far too high on Lonzo Ball. I would still rank him #1 in retrospect because his strengths were so attractive, but I was far too dismissive of his flaws and downside risk.

I was also pretty high on most of the rest of the top 7. Fultz has flopped for somewhat unpredictable reasons– who could have known he was such a headcase? But then other than that Tatum, Fox, Isaac, and Markkanen all look pretty good while Josh Jackson has flopped.

I was correctly bearish on Dennis Smith Jr and ranked him #10, below OG Anunoby who I had #9. I had Donovan Mitchell #11 and I should have had him above DSJ.

Jarrett Allen at #27 was a small mistake and Bam at #28 was a big mistake.

This wasn’t my worst draft year, but it wasn’t my best either.

2018

This draft was so close to being good! I had my famous article on Luka, was bullish on Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, and had Josh Okogie and Kevin Huerter as solid 1st round picks when they weren’t in the consensus top 40.

But then I ruined it with too many hot takes. I still believe Trae Young is highly overrated and is not a player that I would want to build an NBA team around, but it’s clear that he has enough unique talent to be worth a top 10 pick. I went overboard on slandering him by ranking him 15th.

I also massively overhyped Jaren Jackson Jr. He was obviously the correct #2 prospect, and still is a very good one, but I made him 1b to Luka’s 1a which looks really bad in retrospect. I did ponder if he had GOAT upside, and frankly I don’t think it was a totally insane question. But he was so much less proven than Luka at the time, I really analyzed him through an excessively optimistic lens.

Also Zhaire Smith at #5 is a horrible take. I thought it was a good idea to gamble on athleticism, but he obviously had some big question marks that I glazed over too lightly.

Mikal Bridges at #18 was maybe a few slots too low. But I don’t feel too badly about this bc he still isn’t that exciting. We’ll see how he develops over the next few years.

I did correctly rate Jerome Robinson (#58) over Michael Porter Jr. (#9) as a horrific pick, and I had Gary Trent (#27) as a solid round 2 sleeper. I was too low on Mitchell Robinson, however, having him at #34.

Ultimately I feel that my analysis for this draft started off well, but I ended up taking too many unnecessary positions that were against the grain just to be different. I’d rate my analysis this draft collectively as OK, but nothing special.

2019

I didn’t even do a full writeup for this one because I didn’t feel like it. And it’s too early to say much about this draft with so much left to unfold, but so far my rankings look pretty good.

I was a huge bull on Ja Morant and PJ Washington. So far PJ looks like a one of the more solid guys outside of the top 2, and Ja looks like a future star.

It’s still too much to say about Ja, but I would still bet quite a bit that he goes on to have a better NBA career than Trae Young.

I was very low on DeAndre Hunter (#29) and Darius Garland (#19) who appear to be huge mistakes as top 5 picks.

And I had Terence Davis #39, which looks good for a UDFA.

I seem to have have underrated Cam Johnson at #38.

Other than that I didn’t have any strong opinions and we need more time to let things unfold. But I feel that I took fewer unnecessary bold positions than normal and overall I did a pretty decent job this year.

Conclusions

I have had ups and downs at predictions. I have had some good ideas that led to good predictions, and some slightly less good ideas that led to bad predictions.

I don’t know if I will ever replicate my 2014 performance where I was intently watching every top prospect in both NCAA and summer league.  You can really get to know a prospect by watching a player repeatedly in a number of situations.

Since then I haven’t been watching as much, but I still believe there is enough available information to make decent broad strokes predictions between stats, scouting reports, youtube videos, etc.

My goal moving forward will be to be wrong as infrequently as possible. While it’s impossible to be right about everything, it’s easy to not be wrong by simply not taking firm positions when the answer is uncertain. I will still inevitably miss the mark plenty of times, but but by being more humble about the limits of my prediction capabilities the misses should grow to be less frequent and less severe over time.

Let’s see how the next 6 years compare to the first 6!

Draft Reactions

22 Thursday Jun 2017

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Winners

Los Angeles Lakers:
2. Lonzo Ball
27. Kyle Kuzma
30. Josh Hart
42. Thomas Bryant

After a questionable trade of D’Angelo Russell prior to the draft, Magic Johnson and Rob Pelinka absolutely crushed their first draft ever.

Lonzo Ball was the best pick in the draft– both Boston and Philadelphia had the option to take him and both opted for inferior players, and the Lakers ended up with the #1.

Kyle Kuzma has appeal as a tall, fluid, point forward who is rumored to be better at shooting than his NCAA stats suggest. He was a solid choice at #28.

Then Magic channeled his inner Hinkie to trade #28 to Utah (who drafted Tony Bradley) for a nice haul of #30  who he used on one of my favorite sleepers in Josh Hart as well as Thomas Bryant at #42. Bryant will struggle to survive defensively as a pro, but he had good stats and is a decent flier in the mid-2nd.

Toronto Raptors
23. OG Anunoby

A 19 year old freak with Kawhi’s physical profile tears his ACL, and he drops all way to 23 because of it. Yes, he is raw offensively and may never be decent on that end. But I had him as the #9 prospect and he has far more upside than most of the players that were taken ahead of him. He should not have slid outside of the lottery.

San Antonio Spurs
29. Derrick White
59. Jaron Blossomgame

Every year the Spurs take a guy that I rate as a late 1st steal, and every year it makes me second guess whether I didn’t rate him highly enough. White does a little bit of everything, as he has legit point guard skills to create his own shot at the rim, pass, shoot, and he’s a great shot blocker with SG size. Easy to see him as a big steal.

Blossomgame is fine at #59 but this draft is all about White.

Portland Trailblazers
10. Zach Collins
26. Caleb Swanigan

The Blazers had a pretty good night as traded #15 and #20 for my clear best player available at #10 in Zach Collins, and then also took my best player available at #26 in Caleb Swanigan.

Factoring in Jusuf Nurkic’s, they are a bit heavy on bigs but it is no matter. They have plenty of room to develop all three and then decide who to hold and who to deal.

Orlando Magic
6. Jonathan Isaac
33. Wesley Iwundu

Isaac was a great steal at #6 and the 2nd best value pick in the draft after Ball. This alone makes Orlando’s night great.

And it better because the rest of their draft was weak. They traded #25 for an OKC 2020 top 20 protected 1st, reached for Wesley Iwundu at #33, and then traded #35 for something.

Golden State Warriors
38. Jordan Bell

Of course the best team makes the best possible use of $3.5M to buy into the second round and draft a great value and perfect fit. Bell is an incredibly versatile defensive piece who can do it all from protect the rim to switch onto LeBron. He’s raw offensively but he fits well on GSW’s shooting heavy roster.

Losers

Chicago Bulls: Jimmy Butler and #16 (Justin Patton) for #7 (Lauri Markkannen), Zach LaVine, and Kris Dunn

I don’t know how the Timberwolves convinced them to send #16 back for a package centered around Lauri Markkanen, Zach LaVine, and Kris Dunn. Kris Dunn is a 23 year old defensive specialist at PG who posted an 8.1 rookie PER, and is worth about a late 1st pick. LaVine has developed into a solid offensive threat, but is still hardly a centerpiece for the deal.

I had Markkanen as the best player available at #7, but that’s after the draft fell off a cliff with the 6 great talents off the board. He should be a useful role player with a bit of sneaky upside, but he’s too one dimensional to be a justifiable centerpiece for Butler.

The fact that the Bulls sent #16 back is just insanity. They got crushed in the deal for just #7, LaVine, and Dunn, and somehow Minny convinced them they were getting such a great haul they needed to balance it out by throwing back a mid-1st.

Of course Minnesota completely blew the pick on Justin Patton, a big reach who doesn’t fit with KAT. But Minny is nevertheless a clear winner and Chicago is a big loser.

Boston Celtics: 3. Jayson Tatum
Philadelphia 76ers: 1. Markelle Fultz

It’s hard to say who will look better on the Fultz for Tatum and LAL/SAC pick swap. I may slightly favor Boston, simply because Tatum gets to play for Brad Stevens while Fultz is stuck fighting for touches on a team over indexed on ball dominant players. But overall the deal is close, and it could go either way.

Where both teams failed is that they both had the chance to draft Lonzo Ball, and they both failed. The #1 pick is a crucial decision for the franchise, and neither team made the correct choice here.

They also picked other guys later, but who cares. Both teams had access to a stud at #1, and both teams blew it.

New York Knicks
8. Frank Ntilikina
44. Damyean Dotson
58. Ognen Jaramaz

The Knicks got off to a bad start when Phil Jackson publicly suggested that Kristaps Porzingis needs to be traded, then failed to do so.

Then he reached for Frank Ntilikina with Dennis Smith Jr. at #9 and Zach Collins at #10 being clearly superior options. Damyean Dotson isn’t good value at #44, and I don’t know who Ognen Jaramaz is but I highly doubt he redeems the draft whatsoever.

The Knicks are a joke. They have an awful owner who is paying a senile Phil Jackson $12M/year to throw his stars under the bus and make awful decisions, and they are going to stay awful as long as Dolan owns the team. The rest of the NBA is rapidly getting smarter while Dolan stays as out of touch as ever, and as bad as I feel for Knicks fans I would just quit.

If I lived in NY, I’d start caring more about Brooklyn as they are somehow rebuilding faster without having any veteran talent or draft picks.

Detroit Pistons
12. Luke Kennard

Stan Van Gundy is really struggling to both GM and coach the Pistons. If he wanted a quality role playing SG, Donovan Mitchell was on the board as the glaringly obvious best option. There was also a slew of more interesting players at other positions.

Instead he took a one dimensional shooter who doesn’t have the tools to defend anybody in the NBA, but at least he has great intangibles.

Detroit is doomed until they find somebody new to build the roster.

Milwaukee Bucks
17. DJ Wilson
46. Sterling Brown

Jon Horst had his first draft as Bucks GM, and DJ Wilson is not an inspiring first decision. He is tall, long, can shoot, and move, but doesn’t really stuff the statsheet in any bulk category and does not feel like a sharp pick at #17 with players like OG Anunoby, John Collins, Harry Giles, and many other better gambles on the board.

It’s not super harmful, just bodes ill for the future given that Horst was a questionable hire to begin with.

2015 Draft Recap

27 Saturday Jun 2015

Posted by in Miscellaneous

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One of the best parts of the draft is that no matter how advanced statistical predictions become, there will always be a slippery human element that cannot be perfectly priced. This is a downside to making at home evaluations as interviews and workouts are needed for full information, and three first round talents in Christian Wood, Cliff Alexander, and Robert Upshaw went undrafted. But it also makes for stunning surprises on draft night that are fun to assess in retrospect, and it is new information that can be used to re-assess pre-existing perceptions. Here is my recap of the draft:

1. Minnesota: Karl Towns

Timberwolves convert the layup and suddenly their future is not looking bad.

2. LA Lakers: D’Angelo Russell

The Lakers nail the most important decision of the draft. They could have bungled this pick by taking any of Okafor, Porzingis, or Mudiay, but they made the correct pick who was not obvious to everybody. These are the type of decisions that can alter a franchise’s future, so the Lakers are the big winners of the draft by getting this one right.

3. Philadelphia: Jahlil Okafor

The Lakers’ gain comes at the expense of the 76ers, who were set to draft D’Angelo Russell #3 overall. Instead they settle for Jahlil Okafor, who crowds their big man rotation and is an inferior prospect. Sam Hinkie is not building a team, he is assembling a portfolio of liquid assets and Okafor will maintain trade value if he scores efficiently as a rookie. I would have preferred to see Philly trade down for Winslow+, but it would have been difficult to execute for a substantial haul, and it is possible that Hinkie perceives Okafor as the superior prospect independent of trade value.

4. New York: Kristaps Porzingis
5. Orlando: Mario Hezonja

I don’t want to be too aggressively anti-Euros because I am not certain that neither of these guys are really good, but I feel like they are both big mistakes to take over Justise Winslow among a handful of other prospects. If I had to pick one to excel, it would be Hezonja. While Mario seems a bit overhyped to me, I cannot pinpoint anything that strongly caps his upside and it is fine to take him over any non-Winslow prospect. Porzingis has more disconcerting red flags, less upside, and more potential to look like a comically bad pick a few years down the road.

6. Sacramento: Willie Cauley-Stein

Even though I rated Cauley-Stein above Porzingis and Hezonja, this pick is arguably even worse. He is not a good pairing with DeMarcus Cousins, and if the pick was only made because Cousins is going to be traded that does not make the situation any rosier. Further it sounded like everybody was scared off by his ankle and he would have slid to the teens– if they are so locked in on him, why not trade down? Horrible pick by a horrible organization.

7. Denver: Emmanuel Mudiay
8. Detroit: Stanley Johnson

These picks were fine values in a vacuum, but it was nevertheless a mistake to pass on Winslow. Mudiay is the most defensible pick in the 4-9 range, it is possible my critique of this pick will look bad in the future. Stanley over Winslow is more clearly bad– Stanley is a better shooter but Winslow is better at everything else.

9. Charlotte: Frank Kaminsky

Michael Jordan allegedly turned down a massive haul of picks from Boston for this pick. It is amazing that after all of his awful draft picks that he hasn’t reduced his self-confidence in his talent evaluation skills. I wonder if it ever occurred to him that his draft picks consistently bust and that maybe this one is not all that special when he is getting offered way too much from a successful GM who wants somebody else. He should have taken Winslow before whatever Ainge offered, but doing neither and taking Kaminsky is laughable.

If the Pistons took Winslow, this pick would actually be pretty good. Since they instead took Stanley, the Frank pick was a big failure.

10. Miami: Justise Winslow

Miami wins the draft.

11. Indiana: Myles Turner

If Hibbert is on the way out, this is a great landing spot for Turner since Vogel has proven capable at maximizing the shot blocking ability of a center with mobility challenges. I still don’t love the pick, but I can see Turner succeeding in Indiana so I am now less bearish on him than I was pre-draft.

12. Utah: Trey Lyles

Lyles is a fine pick here. As a Jazz fan I would not be particularly excited nor disappointed.

13. Phoenix: Devin Booker

After making my favorite pick in the late lotto last year in TJ Warren, Ryan McDonough followed up with a pick that I don’t like as much. But even though I ranked him #22 on my big board I don’t hate the pick, I would have ranked Booker 6 slots higher before 2 slots lower. Just goes to show how much vastly reasonable minds can differ when the draft runs so deep and there are so many angles of information to examine.

14. Oklahoma City: Cameron Payne

Much like the Devin Booker pick, I have this as a reach by 9 slots according to my big board but I don’t necessarily hate it for OKC. I feel that it’s a slightly bad pick but Payne does have a uniquely appealing flavor to him, and I am more interested in seeing how he pans out than I am making confident projections of his future. I suspect he’s overvalued here but I am a fan and don’t want to root against him.

15. Washington (via ATL): Kelly Oubre

I had Oubre as the BPA and I do not believe he would have slid to 19, so I like the Wiz giving up two 2nds to move up for him. Good move, good pick.

16. Boston: Terry Rozier

Danny Ainge’s biggest draft strengths and weaknesses were on full display last night. When there is a slam dunk pick to be made, he makes it and he correctly tried to pay up to acquire Justise Winslow in a trade every pick from 4 to 9. But once Charlotte declined, Ainge showed his weakness of reaching for busts when no clear BPA exists (see: Marcus Banks, Fab Melo, JR Giddens, maybe James Young). I rated Rozier 50th on my big board, and in retrospect that is far too low given his athleticism and defense baseline to go along with a competent jump shot. He is 1″ shorter with 1″ longer wingspan than Avery Bradley, and it is well within reach for him to become a similar caliber player which is not a terrible outcome for the #16 overall pick.

Of course the point of the draft is not to avoid bad outcomes, it is to achieve great outcomes. The Celtics already have two young, undersized 3 + D SG’s and adding a third one who upgrades neither is of little value to a team that got swept in the first round. It’s clear that they are gambling on Brad Stevens being able to parlay Rozier’s great first step and work ethic into an effective NBA slasher. The value of Rozier as a prospect largely hinges on the value of his slashing upside, and there is a coherent argument to be made that he has enough to be an acceptable selection at #16 overall. I still believe it was a reach given how limited his PG skills and decision making are for a 21 year old, but a less egregious one than my initial big board would indicate.

17. Milwaukee: Rashad Vaughn

This pick is a bit of a reach and I do not particularly like it, but Vaughn is young and can score. I suppose the Bucks believe a likely inefficient chucker has more value on a team with great defense and horrible offense.

18. Houston: Sam Dekker

This pick is solid– Dekker was on the short list of best players available and he fits well as a smallish 4 next to Dwight.

19. New York (via ATL): Jerian Grant

It is hard to fathom how a FO that acquired 4/5 of a 60 win starting lineup with FA contracts all < $10M/year has blown consecutive mid-1st rounders so badly. After spewing the #15 pick on Adriean Payne last year, the Hawks one upped themselves this year by trading down to #19 and then shipping that for a player who is proven to be bad in Tim Hardaway Jr.

This is obviously nice for the Knicks since they clearly won the trade and then took a decent prospect in Grant. It slightly redeems the Porzingis pick.

20. Toronto: Delon Wright

One of the best FO’s in the draft takes one of my favorite sleepers in Delon to replace the recently dealt Greivis Vasquez. This is a nice pick, Masai Ujiri just vacuums free pennies and nickels with almost every move he makes.

21. Dallas: Justin Anderson

Nice pick by the Mavs as they scoop a solid 3 + D wing.

22. Chicago: Bobby Portis

Great pick by the Bulls, Fred Hoiberg can do damage building an offense around a Mirotic/Portis big man tandem that provides elite spacing.

23. Portland: Rondae Hollis-Jefferson

Portland eventually traded this pick to Brooklyn for #41 and Mason Plumlee, and Mason Plumlee is quite the vig to just move up from 41 to 23. But RHJ is also a great pick, so this might be the one time ever that Billy King overpaying to get what he wants works out favorably for him. Still I’m surprised that RHJ fell this low, perhaps I’m underrating how detrimental he will be on offense in the NBA but it’s great value regardless.

24. Minnesota: Tyus Jones

31 + 36 is not a cheap price for 24, but with so many promising young players on rookie deals the Wolves were in a position to overpay for a slider. I like the move and I like the pick.

I don’t like Cleveland’s side unless Cedi Osman is much better than I am giving him credit for. The Cavs likely wanted to save cap room to help keep their roster together, but Rakeem Christmas was never good until he was a 23 year old senior. Also Tyus Jones, Kevon Looney, and RJ Hunter were some nice options to pair with LeBron.

25. Memphis: Jarell Martin

After going analytics heavy last year with Jordan Adams and Jarnell Stokes, Memphis went with traditional scouting and physical tools with Jarell Martin this year. This is a bit of a reach.

26. San Antonio: Nikola Milutinov

The Spurs went international to preserve cap space for FA, and they took the player I singled out as best international available who was also in the mix for best not injured player available. I’m always happy to see the sharpest team agree with me.

27. LA Lakers: Larry Nance, Jr.

I like gambling on Nance this late. He is an explosive dunker who stuffs the statsheet and I have mentioned a couple of times that overachieving draft slot runs in the family with his dad having 2nd highest all time win shares among picks outside of the top 16.

28. Boston: RJ Hunter

The Celtics vaguely redeem the Rozier fiasco by taking the best healthy player available, but the night is still overall bad.

29. Brooklyn: Chris McCullough

Solid pick by one of the worst FO’s in the history of life.

30. Golden State: Kevon Looney

Looney’s stock plummeted due to news that he may need hip surgery, but there’s no way this is not awesome value for the Warriors. Great pick by the defending champs.

32. Houston: Montrezl Harrell

I find this pick surprising. Harrell cannot be paired with Dwight Howard, and he doesn’t make sense as a backup between his lack of size and Clint Capela’s presence. I also don’t think he was great value, but I suppose Daryl Morey disagrees and either thinks Harrell has a chance of learning to make 3’s or might have trade value down the road since he was the only projected 1st rounder available. It’s just a second rounder so I don’t want to criticize this pick too harshly, it mostly just stood out to me as unexpected.

40. Miami: Josh Richardson

Not only does Miami get the steal of the draft in Justise Winslow at 10, but they take my favorite 2nd round sleeper at #40 who I wrote about when he was in neither DX nor ESPN’s top 100.

46. Toronto: Norman Powell

Masai scoops another penny by picking my other favorite 2nd round sleepers as part of a haul for Greivis Vasquez that also included a lottery protected Clippers’ 1st rounder. Raptors had a strong night as they clearly won the Vasquez trade and got good value on both draft picks.

Overall

The draft really fell off a cliff in round 2 after Looney went off the board, there are such few players I feel inclined to comment on. But round 1 was loaded with talent, almost everybody drafted has a strong chance of becoming at least a useful rotation player. I had a tough time finding first round picks to aggressively doubt this year, so this could go down as one of the deepest first rounds of all time.

Billy Donovan: NBA Coaching Prospect

29 Wednesday Apr 2015

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With recent news that the Thunder have focused their search on Florida coach Billy Donovan, it is worth reviewing his NCAA performance to assess his upside as an NBA coach.

Donovan peaked when his Gators won back to back championships in 2006 and 2007 with the elite core of Joakim Noah, Al Horford, and Corey Brewer. Of course any coach would excel with that trio staying until their junior seasons, so it is more interesting to assess how he fared following their departure:

Season final kenpom rank Recruiting class rank
2015 45 13
2014 3 6
2013 2 24
2012 11 24
2011 16 9
2010 48 20
2009 42 2
2008 44 3

It is fair to expect a bit of a down year following a max exodus of talent, but given the quality of talent he brought in with perennial top 25 recruiting classes four seasons outside of the top 40 is rather alarming.

His loaded 07-08 recruiting class included current NBA players Nick Calathes and Chandler Parsons and he also returned sophomore Marreese Speights. Succeeding with youth can be difficult, but it is not like he was working with a bunch of talentless duds. Meanwhile, Florida failed to reach the NCAA tournament with three future NBA players.

The following season Florida lost Speights to the NBA but returned Calathes and Parsons for their sophomore seasons (along with #53 RSCI player Alex Tyus from the same class) and with another loaded recruiting class still missed the tournament.

In 2009-10 Florida finally returned to the tournament as a 10 seed in spite of Calathes departing for Europe, but still could not crack the top 40. It was not until Parsons’s senior season that Florida finally returned to the top 25 making an Elite 8 run before losing to Brad Stevens’s Butler squad.

The whole Parsons era looks bad for Donovan’s record– in four full seasons with the player and plenty of access to other elite talent Florida only cracked the top 40 once and never made the top 15. While the #16 team that went Elite 8 may seem like it saves some face, that team was loaded with experienced talent. The starting lineup:

Player RSCI rank Season PER WS/40
Vernon Macklin 16 Senior 22.2 0.16
Erving Walker 79 Junior 20 0.177
Chandler Parsons 39 Senior 19.7 0.163
Alex Tyus 53 Senior 18.7 0.145
Kenny Boynton 9 Sophomore 17.5 0.155

This is the type of talent that a good coach should be able to convert into a top 5 contender. Forget that Parsons is the only NBA player on the roster– in spite of being a senior he completely blends in with the rest of the starters statistically. Not only did Donovan underwhelm with a collection of upperclass 4 and 5 star talent, but he also failed to maximize Parsons’s talent. His value as a second round steal was evident from his rookie season where he finished 9th in ROY voting and 5th in rookie win shares. It is not difficult to envision a superior coach making Parsons an obvious first round selection after four seasons.

The counterpoint this is that coaches improve, and the Gators certainly took a leap forward after Parsons’ departure. In 11-12, Florida replaced their three departing senior starters with freshman Bradley Beal, sophomore Patric Young, and junior Erik Murphy and finished 11th and once again lost in the Elite 8, this time to Louisville.

The appealing part of Donovan’s post-repeat resume comes in the 12-13 and 13-14 seasons, as Florida finished with back to back top 3 kenpom teams without a single NBA draft pick on the roster. He did it with defense: After ranking 123rd, 113th, 91st, 41st, and 90th in schedule adjusted defensive rating in the prior five seasons, Florida leapt forward to the 4th and 2nd defenses. They did this with a middling block rate as well, as the defense delivered a strong balance of forcing opponents into difficult mid-range shots, forcing turnovers, rebounding, and limiting free throw attempts.

The timing of the spike in defense is no coincidence either, as it coincided with Donovan becoming analytically enlightened and placing an increased emphasis on defense. That said, the article does not cite any example of Donovan using analytics to improve the defense. It only states that analytics were employed to bring Donovan to the obvious realization that defense is important, so there is little evidence to suggest that he developed into a defensive mastermind. If anything the writeup implies that Donovan takes an overwhelmingly simple minded approach to analytics, focusing on the result rather than the process.

The common link to the great defensive teams was the elite 2014 graduating class of Patric Young, Will Yeguette, Casey Prather, and Scottie Wilbekin. While none of them were noteworthy NBA prospects by the time they graduated (Young had lottery hype as a sophomore), they were all high quality NCAA players who made strong contributions on both ends of the floor.

Give Donovan credit for maximizing returns on the talent of his class of unheralded college stars, but he was unable to sustain any of their success once they left. This was not for lack of talent either. In 2014-15, Florida was ranked 7th in both the AP and coaches pre-season polls, projected to finish 7th by kenpom and team rankings projection models and 6th by Dan Hanner’s model. The team suffered their share of bad luck, especially with injuries. #31 RSCI freshman Brandone Francis missed the entire season due to academic ineligibility, rotation guard Eli Carter missed 5 games, and Florida’s two best players Michael Frazier and Dorian Finney-Smith missed 7 and 5 games respectively. But injuries were not all that went wrong: 5 star sophomores Chris Walker and Kasey Hill both had vastly disappointing seasons. Hill regressed statistically from his freshman season and Walker fell from a possible lottery pick to likely undrafted after finally getting consistent playing time. Further neither #20 RSCI freshman Devin Robinson, #49 freshman Chris Chiozza, or Duke transfer Alex Murphy were able to play well enough to atone for their deficiencies.

Donovan’s newfound defensive obsession enabled the Gators to maintain the #11 kenpom defense, but their offense plunged to #151 after ranking #12 and #18 in the prior two seasons. This supports the narrative that Donovan merely gives most of his attention to defense rather than having concocted a strong defensive scheme. There is no reason for the offense to be so woefully bad other than punting on that end to meet arbitrary defensive benchmarks that Donovan deems necessary to contend. A good coach should aim to balance both ends for the optimal bottom line, not go all in on one side of the ball no matter the cost to the other.

Florida had the depth and talent to sustain a bit of injury misfortune and still have a top 25 team, but they finished as the #45 kenpom team and missed the tournament with a below .500 record. It is as if the Parsons era was starting to repeat itself all over again– Donovan gets acclaim for thriving off an exceptional class and then fails to maximize his incoming talent and disappoints. This is why he is a middle of the road NCAA coach: when he has the right collection of players he can thrive, but he is also prone to big disappointment in other scenarios where it is easy to envision a great coach excelling.

It is somewhat baffling that any NBA team is interested in Donovan after his most recent season, let alone the team with the best collection of young talent in the league. Dipping into NCAA ranks for a coach with elite recruiting pedigree and average coaching acumen is a tried and true formula for NBA coaching failure, and there is no reason to expect Donovan to buck the trend. This is especially true with the recent influx of strong NBA coaches, as the bar for good NBA coaching gets higher every season. While there are some legitimately good NBA coaching prospects in the NCAA (namely Fred Holberg), Donovan does not even sniff the radar as a coach with upside. Perhaps he can learn to use analytics to a more useful degree and avoid being a colossal failure, especially with a lackluster predecessor in Scott Brooks. But there is no way that of all of the coaching candidates in the basketball world, he is the candidate most likely to succeed at one of the most desirable NBA coaching jobs.

Updating My Prospect Perception

16 Thursday Apr 2015

Posted by in Miscellaneous

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I posted my reactions to 2014 draft rookie seasons, and if there is one point to be gleaned: I underrated athleticism. The players that I overrated are all non-leapers and the players the I regret bashing the most (Wiggins and LaVine) are the top two athletes in the draft. Rodney Hood is not an exceptional athlete, but among the players that I graded as bad defensive prospects (McDermott, Napier, Hood, Stauskas) he comfortably has the best first step and delivered comfortably the best offensive performance as a rookie.

I had an inkling that athleticism was overrated since I am a habitual fader of hype, and athleticism seems to correlate with hype. But there are plenty of non-athlete prospects that were overhyped, and after witnessing my predictions in motion I believe athleticism might actually be underrated.

The other issue is that I was far too wary of statistical performances in my rankings. Sometimes NCAA statistics will call to attention relevant details that receive too little attention from scouts and GM’s, such as Adreian Payne’s age and poor feel for the game. But they often reflect success that does not directly translate to the NBA, and paying it too much regard led me down the wrong path a handful of times. While statistics are a helpful tabulation that should always price in, it is impossible to form efficient draft rankings without the aid of physical profiles and the eye test.

If I wanted to have more efficient rankings, I could have taken fewer risks and shaded my disagreements a bit moreso toward consensus. But I am a habitual upstream swimmer and it helped illuminate the flaws in my thought processes to really go out on limbs, so I gambled away. Ultimately it resulted in a messier final big board than necessary, but this was also an inevitable result of experimenting with a wide range of ideas that were not all good.

On the positive side of the equation, my idea to track who creates their own half-court buckets at the rim appears to be a possibly relevant one. The players who excelled all appear to be great draft values: Elfrid Payton, TJ Warren, and Jordan Clarkson. Austin Rivers is there as a friendly reminder that you need to do things other than slash to the rim to become a good NBA’er. Conversely the players who ranked horribly tend to be busts: Cleanthony Early, Shabazz Napier, CJ Wilcox, Kyle Anderson, and Gary Harris stand out. Zach LaVine is a player who might buck the trend due to his inexperience and lack of ball handling duties, and Marcus Smart may not be a bust but it certainly is not because of his slashing ability displayed as a rookie.

My first writeup was entitled “The Draft Starts With Defense” and it is not the worst motto. After parsing through my defensive cliff notes, there appears to be a correlation between defensive aptitude and value with respect to draft slot.

Because I am addicted to making lists, this is what my pre-draft rankings should have been strictly based on pre-draft information. There may be a hint of hindsight bias involved, but it’s not like this ranking counts for anything anyway. I am leaving out Bruno Caboclo because there is no way I could have accurately assessed him without knowing he existed:

1. Joel Embiid

2. Aaron Gordon
3. Andrew Wiggins
4. Marcus Smart
5. Dante Exum

6. TJ Warren
7. Elfrid Payton
8. Jabari Parker
9. Jusuf Nurkic
10. Clint Capela

11. Noah Vonleh
12. Mitch McGary
13. Damien Inglis
14. KJ McDaniels
15. Tyler Ennis
16. Spencer Dinwiddie
17. Dario Saric
18. James Young
19. Nikola Jokic
20. Jarnell Stokes
21. Julius Randle
22. Zach LaVine
23. Kyle Anderson
24. Nik Stauskas
25. Jordan Adams
26. Vasilije Micic
27. Bogdan Bogdanovic
28. Gary Harris
29. PJ Hairston
30. Jerami Grant
31. Walter Taveras
32. Adreian Payne
33. Rodney Hood
34. Doug McDermott
35. Jordan Clarkson
36. Glenn Robinson
37. Dwight Powell
38. Semaj Christon
39. Alec Brown
40. Nick Johnson

2014 Draft Class Rookie Year Review

16 Thursday Apr 2015

Posted by in Miscellaneous

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Now that we have a full season of new information for the 2014 draft class, it is time to update my beliefs. It will still be a while before we have a clear image of who should have been picked where, but the new information is also not trivial so I can offer some tentative self assessments with draft slot, my final big board rank, and my post summer league rank.

Players I overrated:

Dante Exum: Drafted: #5, Final Big: #2, Post-SL: #4
Nik Stauskas: Drafted #8, Final Big: #14, Post-SL: #15
Tyler Ennis: Drafted: #18, Final Big: #9, Post-SL: #16
Kyle Anderson: Drafted: #30, Final Big: #15, Post-SL: #19

Interestingly I cannot find many players that I badly overrated. Part of this is that it remains to be seen whether my optimism for players such as KJ McDaniels, Jarnell Stokes, and the entire international class was warranted. So for now these prospects are the focal point.

By far the biggest surprise among players I liked was Dante Exum, and I was even prepared to be surprised for him. While he gets some slack for being young and having a steep rise in competition, it is difficult to envision him becoming a star after his rookie season. To some extent it is acceptable to say he was a worthwhile gamble that did not pay off as hoped and move on. But it is worth noting 2 key details that could have received more attention pre-draft

1) My motto is that upside is all that matters in the draft, and it is worth stomaching downside to get a healthy slice of it. But without the proven competence against NCAA competition, a mystery box like Exum loses a chunk of upside since he is less likely to hit his theoretical upper bound than the players who passed that check point.

2) Exum has awesome size and quickness, but his lack of burst did not receive much attention. It seemed that it would be outweighed by his good tools, but his disappointment suggests that explosiveness is particularly important for any high usage slasher.

Tyler Ennis can still go on to have a perfectly decent career, but I only rated him highly because his statistical splits piqued my interest. He never stood out when I watched him play, so this is a simple error of getting too intrigued by a statistical trend that I could not directly explain.

Kyle Anderson had great stats and skill, but moving in slow motion on top of having a questionable work ethic appears to be a problem for him. I do not feel I badly overrated him, but I should have docked him more for being historically unathletic.

Nik Stauskas I correctly pegged as having bad tools and being a guaranteed bad defensive player, but he had qualities I subtly liked enough to not drop him significantly below consensus. I should have ranked him slightly lower because his sophomore year was not offensively dominant enough to brush off his physical and defensive shortcomings.

Players I underrated:
Andrew Wiggins: Drafted: #1, Final Big: #7, Post-SL: #6
Zach LaVine: Drafted #13, Final Big: #35, Post-SL: #10
TJ Warren: Drafted #14, Final Big: #28, Post-SL: #3
Mitch McGary: Drafted #21, Final Big: #25, Post-SL: #9
Rodney Hood: Drafted #23, Final Big: #57, Post-SL: #36
Jordan Clarkson: Drafted: #46, Final Big: #52, Post-SL: NR

Andrew Wiggins has surprised me in a few regards: he fixed the rim finishing woes in a hurry, and he seems to have become less passive as he went from never dunking in the half-court to routinely trying to dunk on giant rim protectors such as Omer Asik and Rudy Gobert. There were a number of subtleties I disliked about him, but it appears that I underweighted his super athleticism. I am not convinced that he is a future star, and I still believe it was insane to take him ahead of Embiid but I should have been less bearish on him.

Zach LaVine is still a bit of a mystery box after finishing his rookie season with negative win shares, but he showed enough potential such that I should have rated him as a 1st rounder.

TJ Warren and Mitch McGary were simple cases of weirdos that I failed to scout and then immediately regretted it as soon as I watched them in summer league. They are going to put big dents in the quality of my final big board, but it merely goes to show that weirdos need to be scouted to be evaluated accurately.

Rodney Hood I am not sure why I dropped all the way to 57th, as I noted that he had potential to be solid offensively in spite of his woeful defense. His post-SL ranking of #36 seems much more reasonable. I could have given his good first step more attention as it has aided his translation to the NBA.

Jordan Clarkson makes a strong case for scoring at the rim unassisted in the half-court being a relevant split as it was his only unique feature.

Players I (hopefully) rated approximately correctly:
Aaron Gordon: Drafted: #4, Final Big: #4, Post-SL: #5
Marcus Smart: Drafted: #6, Final Big: #3, Post-SL: #3
Doug McDermott: Drafted: #11, Final Big: #34, Post-SL: #32
Adreian Payne: Drafted: #15, Final Big: #32, Post-SL: #33
Jusuf Nurkic: Drafted: #16, Final Big: #5, Post-SL: #8
Gary Harris: Drafted: #19, Final Big: #24, Post-SL: #23
Shabazz Napier: Drafted: #24, Final Big: #37, Post-SL: NR
Clint Capela: Drafted #25, Final Big: #6, Post-SL: #14

Aaron Gordon is so young and funky that it is hard to say exactly what he will become as a pro. But he showed enough promise as a rookie to make me feel good about altering my opinion from bearish to bullish.

Marcus Smart has been a disappointment as a slasher, but he has atoned by shooting better than expected from 3 with more spot ups and fewer off the dribble attempts and having sharp passing vision. And as I repeatedly mentioned, he is a stud on defense. He may never become much of a scorer, but he is going to be an awesome role player.

Doug McDermott is the first prospect I wrote about on this blog, and it was for good reason. He never belonged anywhere near the lottery, and after his rookie season I would say that I nailed my analysis of him.

Adreian Payne was a prospect that sounded sweet on paper but was loathed by every statistical model in the world. It was a surprise to see one of the better organizations draft him so early, but it appears that stat nerds have won this debate.

Jusuf Nurkic disappointed a big down the stretch of his rookie season, but overall showed enough promise to verify that he was a top 10 prospect in the draft.

I could have ranked Gary Harris a bit lower, as he seemed to have lots of downside and little upside. But I feel that this is one of my more perceptive positions, as this was a rare case where statistical models and scouts agreed but I did not.

Shabazz Napier was free money to fade. Poor Miami drafted him to impress LeBron and LeBron left them anyway.

There is no evidence to justify my bullishness for Clint Capela yet, but I am merely reinforcing my opinion. This seems like a case where the behind the scenes information caused him to slip, but the fact of the matter is that he was toolsy and productive and the behind the scenes info was likely noise clouding the signal. I look forward to seeing what he can accomplish in a real role next season.

Playing The Round 2 Lotto

22 Tuesday Apr 2014

Posted by in Miscellaneous, NCAA

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Round 2 is the uneventful part of the draft, where the majority of picks amount to little or nothing.  But sometimes teams uncover solidly useful players such as Chandler Parsons, Isaiah Thomas, Paul Millsap, Kyle Korver, Danny Green, Omer Asik, etc.  The goal of drafting in round 2 should be to draft a starting caliber player such as the aforementioned names.  It is more likely that you can find a fringe bench player such as Chris Duhon, but those types offer little value since they can always be acquired with the veteran’s minimum.  Bearing that in mind, I’d like to review some of the highly rated players that I’d pass on and the unheralded players who I’d target instead:

Do Not Draft: CJ Wilcox (#32 ESPN, #35 DX)

I have no problems with Wilcox’s game, as he is a solidly good college player without any glaring warts.  But the underlying logic to rate him as a fringe 1st round prospect is so backwards that the thought of him going round 1 is somewhat grating to me.  CJ Wilcox is a good shooter, as he shot 39% from 3’s and 87% from FT as a senior.  He also has average size and athleticism for an NBA SG.  If you were required to trot out a round 2 prospect for bench minutes in 2014-15 season and hope he does not submarine your 2nd unit, Wilcox would not a bad pick.  But that is the opposite of the correct goal for drafting in round 2, as teams are not required to play their 2nd rounders.  And unless he was woefully misused in his 4 years at Washington, he is drawing dead to become a starting caliber SG.  He turns 24 in December and his skills outside of shooting are largely underdeveloped.  As a senior, he was roughly the same player he was as a freshmen and is not much of a handler, passer, rebounder, or defender.  Considering his age, it is exceptionally unlikely that he develops his non-shooting skills to NBA levels of competence, and it’s not like he’s a Kyle Korver or JJ Redick level shooter.  His upside is roughly Willie Green, the poster child for replacement level SG.

Instead Draft: Isaiah Sykes (unranked ESPN, unranked DX)

Sykes is the inverse Wilcox, in that he’s good at everything except shooting.  This was roughly Chandler Parsons’s appeal: he was a good handler, passer, rebounder, and finisher and then when his shot developed better than expected he quickly became a solid starter.  Sykes is 6’5 with a 6’11 wingspan and exceptional athleticism, and he offers defensive upside that Parsons lacked.  He racked up a solid steal rate in his final 2 seasons at Central Florida, and could be effective on this end playing for an NBA coach.  Also he is a good rebounder, ball handler, and passer, and his shot is not completely hopeless as he shot 34 for 103 (33%) from 3 for his college career, improving his 3p% each season.  The downside is that he shot poorly from the FT line (54% as a senior 56% overall) and was generally an inefficient and turnover prone player in his large offensive workload.  He turns 23 in December which gives him limited time to improve his shot, but his shooting splits are not too different from Parsons who was similarly bad at FT’s and merely took a higher volume of 3’s.  If his shot can take a mini-leap and he lands with an NBA coach who gives his game a nice haircut, he has enough positive qualities to become a solidly good cog in any NBA unit.

Do Not Draft: Jahii Carson (#38 ESPN, #42 DX)

Why is this guy a prospect?  He’s explosive, but he’s also diminutive at 5’11 and not exceptionally skilled.  He’s a solid but not great shooter and passer, and he struggles to finish inside amongst the trees in college.  He also is a near lock to be woefully bad on defense given his size and the fact that he did not accrue many steals to help atone for this.  He has developed a reputation as a selfish player and he is old for a sophomore as he turns 22 in August.  There is little to like and oh so much to dislike.

Instead Draft: Kendrick Perry (unranked ESPN, unranked DX)

Perry is also diminutive, as he recently measured 5’11.75 in shoes and 169 pounds at Portsmouth.  But he atones with exceptional explosiveness and length with a 6’6 wingspan.  Even though he’s a senior, he’s actually 4 months younger than Carson.  And while he shares Jahii’s burst with similar shooting and passing abilities, he is also better at everything else.  He’s a better finisher, rebounder, defender, and superior at protecting the ball.  He completely and utterly outclasses Carson in every way conceivable, and the fact that Jahii is on draft radar and Perry isn’t speaks to the inefficiency of consensus prospect rankings.

Do Not Draft: Cleanthony Early (#24 ESPN, #27 DX)

Well, this hype train sure got out of hand in a hurry.  I rather like Early as a college player, but considering him in round 1 is a hilarious overreaction to a well timed career game vs. Kentucky in the tournament.  Early appeared incapable of ever missing a jump shot vs UK, but you can trust me on this one: he sometimes missed shots in his other games.  He has solid size and good athleticism for a SF, but really what else is there?  He’s a solid but not exceptional shooter, and his finishing will struggle to translate when he is facing NBA competition rather than undersized Missouri Valley Conference bigs.  While his athleticism enables him to average 1 block per game, he projects to be a liability on defense overall.  And most troubling is this blurb from DX:

“The only small forwards drafted with a lower assist percentage in our database spanning back to 2001 (who played over 20 minutes per game in that college season) are Lazar Hayward, Al Thornton, Shabazz Muhammad, Dahntay Jones, Deshaun Thomas, Bobby Jones, Damion James and Maurice Ager”

Yikes, that is a frighteningly worthless collection of players.  And to make matters worse, Early’s pitiful assist rate came at age 22 (he turned 23 last week), and he should have learned to sometimes pass by now.  This calls his feel for the game into question, and it’s difficult to envision him becoming useful vs. NBA competition.

Draft Instead: Javon McCrea (unranked ESPN, unranked DX)

If only because his stats are frighteningly similar to those of Paul Millsap:
USG% O-Rtg eFG% FT% AST%
Millsap 26.9 114.3 57.6 62.3 8.2
McCrea 28.3 115 56.2 66.7 16.6
ORB% DRB% STL% BLK% Height
Millsap 18.1 23.9 3.2 6.7 6’7
McCrea 13.7 20.6 2.7 7.2 6’7

These stats are from each player’s final season of college, and McCrea will only be 3 months older as of draft night.

Millsap played a tougher schedule and is clearly the superior prospect with his advantages in rebounding and steals.  But McCrea’s assist advantage is not to be scoffed at, as assist rates correlate with feel for the game.  But falling short of Millsap’s goodness is not a bad thing, as he was woefully undervalued sliding to 47th overall in the 2006 draft.  More importantly, Millsap proves that undersized mid-major bullies do not necessarily flop in the pros.  McCrea’s assist and steal rates offer hope that he has the feel and length to become something in the NBA.  It will be interesting to see how he measures out pre-draft, because he offers intrigue as a 2nd round flier based on his stat stuffing and parallels to Millsap.

Do Not Draft: Rodney Hood (#21 ESPN #23 DX)

I have been bashing Hood all season, and finally DX and ESPN are starting to catch up as they no longer have him as a top 20 pick.  Nevertheless, he should never get picked in round 1 and I do not find him to be particularly compelling in round 2 either.  His only positive tool is that he has solid height for an NBA SF, and even that is in part due to his long neck.  He has subpar strength, length, quicks, and athleticism.  And to make matters worse, he has awful instincts defensively and doesn’t seem interested in working hard on this end either.  He projects to be somewhere on the scale of worst all time defender to a clear liability.  What does he bring offensively to offset this?  He’s a good shooter and a solid passer with decent feel for the (offensive aspect of the) game.  That is all.  He doesn’t rebound and isn’t much of ball handler or finisher.  It’s difficult to envision his offense amounting to enough to make his defense worth stomaching.  When at age 21 you are just the 6th best player on a team that cannot win a single tourney game, it may be a sign you aren’t going to excel in the NBA.

(Side note: as an avid Duke watcher my player ratings this past season are: Amile > Jabari >> Cook > Dawkins > Sulaimon > Hood.  Amile is the Amir Johnson of college: he goes unnoticed due to low scoring totals but makes a ton of good plays, not many bad ones, and has an overall surprisingly positive impact.)

Draft Instead: Artem Klimenko (unranked ESPN, #35 DX)

Klimenko is a complete and utter mystery box, which makes him a great player to target in round 2.  He is 7’1 with a 7’4 wingspan and good mobility, but at age 20 he has yet to face any level of challenging competition.  According to DX he is averaging 15 points in 24 minutes on 57% inside the arc against weak Russian competition.   This means little for his NBA projection, but at least he’s dominating the dregs like he should.  Also he shoots 74% from the line, which offers hope that he has some semblance of skill.  The primary question is whether he has the instincts and intelligence to maximize his physical tools and become a useful NBA defensive player, which is where he has the most potential.  If he does, then perhaps whoever gambles on him will acquire an Omer Asik level steal.  If not, at least you didn’t waste your pick on a player who has already strongly suggested that he lacks upside.  Teams can glean more regarding how worthwhile of a gamble Klimenko is via interviews and workouts.  But as a general concept: young, toolsy internationals with fuzzy translation are good targets as the talent on the board thins.  Giannis Antetokoumpo going 15th overall last year is a good example of this.

Closing Thoughts:

The players I listed as solid round 2 targets are some ultra deep sleepers, and it’s reasonably likely that all of them amount to nothing.  The vast majority of players who ever may amount to anything are already on DX/ESPN’s radar at this stage, and the best 2nd round picks will likely be players who are already on the radar and slide too far.  For instance: Spencer Dinwiddie (#42 ESPN/#49 DX) has become a bit of a forgotten man after his ACL injury.  But he still may declare nevertheless, and he may slide to round 2 and then become a Korver/Green level role playing wing.  Jarnell Stokes (#28 ESPN, #49 DX) also may make for a valuable role player with his unique combination of speed, strength, and skill.  But these players also may go in round 1 and the players that *should* merit 1st round consideration often make for the best 2nd round picks.

Since it is difficult to anticipate precisely where everybody will land when the draft actually happens, I constrained myself to scraping the barrel for this exercise.  So take this as a demonstration of my logic for uncovering diamonds in the rough as opposed to my list of favorite round 2 sleepers, as it will ultimately be the Dinwiddie/Stokes type sliders who are the slickest steals.

Podcast with Brew Hoop: Part 1

10 Monday Mar 2014

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Yesterday afternoon I had the pleasure of recording a podcast with Frank Madden and Steven von Horn of Brew Hoop. They are both sharp, perceptive basketball minds and it was rather enjoyable to discuss the draft with them. The podcast will be split into 3 or 4 parts that will be released over the course of this week. Here is a direct link to their site where you can stream part 1 (which focuses on Andrew Wiggins) and read more detail.

Listen to this episode in browser | Download this episode (right click and save)

High School Scouts Say The Darndest Things

05 Wednesday Mar 2014

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When discussing draft prospects, it seems that people are often afraid to confidently assert that the scouts who drive the consensus are flat out wrong.  This surprises me, since they have been wrong to hilarious degrees in the past, and will continue to be wrong going forward.  They were able to recognize that LeBron James was a fairly awesome prospect, so that establishes that at least they have operative eyesight.  But they also thought that Darko Milicic was half a notch below LeBron as a prospect, even though he never possessed any basketball playing ability of note.  VJL recently made an excellent post on the irrelevance of hype, and I’d like to highlight some qualitative examples to show where high school scouts badly missed the mark.

Many scouts are woefully bad at assessing prospect skill level, especially in watching them go against high school competition. A recent example is UCLA’s Zach LaVine, when Chad Ford noted that a few scouts called him “Russell Westbrook with a jump shot.” Of course the only things LaVine has in common with Russell are his leaping ability and his decision to attend UCLA. Granted, he doesn’t get to show off much of his PG skill with Kyle Anderson and his virtuoso passing ability running the offense. But he also isn’t trusted enough as the backup PG, as those duties fall to Bryce Alford. And his assist rate (13.8%) doesn’t stand out from UCLA’s other wings as Jordan Adams (14.0%) and Norman Powell (12.7%) who are definitely not PG’s have similar assist rates. Ford notes that LaVine has a propensity to look for his shot instead of passing, but the fact of the matter is that he hardly has any dribble penetration skills whatsoever. On the season he is 11/28 on rim FG’s in the half-court offense, only 6’3 non-leaper Bryce Alford has fewer attempts at 10/25. Adams (44/67) Anderson (24/44) and Powell (44/73) all show vastly superior penetration ability. It is possible that his low attempts are due to lack of confidence in finishing in traffic given his thin build, but his handles look awfully pedestrian to me. He appears to be a SG through and through.

To bring back the Westbrook comparison, he led his UCLA team in assists as a sophomore in spite of playing a fair amount of SG with Darren Collison running the show. Like LaVine he didn’t get the chance to fully flaunt his PG skills, but at least he flaunted something, as the Thunder drafted him in large part to his strong performance as primary ball handler when Collison was out. LaVine has not begun to display flashes of PG skill, yet Chad Ford writes:

While he isn’t really running the point for UCLA, most scouts who have seen him in high school think he has all the tools to be a NBA point guard down the road

Why do they believe this? I don’t know, maybe they saw him dribble down the open court and finish spectacularly in transition and wrote down “POINT GOD” in their scrapbooks. If he develops his handles and passing at an inordinate rate then maybe he could be a PG, but to weigh that as a significant possibility at this stage is wishful thinking. Comparing him to Westbrook is silly so long as they have such an inordinate gap in PG skills, but many scouts are bad at deducing these sort of gaping differences so they wouldn’t know any better.

Now you may be thinking that while scouts may not be experts on deducing basketball playing ability, you gotta give credit to their ability to eye test tools. This is also wrong. Let’s take Noah Vonleh, in November of 2011 DraftExpress writes:

Standing a legit 6-8, with a 7-3 wingspan, huge hands, a terrific frame and excellent athleticism, Vonleh does not look like your typical 16-year old.

I imagine that the “excellent athleticism” was simply a commonly held belief in HS scoutings circles, as his ESPN recruiting profile notes that his “physical intangibles” include “extraordinarily long arms and bounce.” While he has done well as a freshman for Indiana, it is not due to leaping ability, as Vonleh has struggled to finish at the rim in spite of his size and length due to lackluster athleticism. To DX’s credit, they noticed that the initial assertion was incorrect and in their recent scouting video note that Vonleh is “not a leaper” and list lack of explosiveness as a weakness. But the bottom line is that HS scouts are not specially trained to deduce physical tools, and when they see a super long player like Vonleh dunking or blocking a shot, they conflate his impressive use of length with athleticism.  Consequently, it is not safe to take their tool assessments entirely at face value.

Now let’s see what ESPN’s recruiting service said about Julius Randle’s future:

His reputation as a good person and hard worker will aid him as he hopes to improve and stave off competitian for his slot

This is part of a short writeup on the #2 prospect in America, and they couldn’t even spell “competition” correctly.  I know this strays from basketball analysis, but most of their writeups do appear to have been translated from English to Estonian and back to English using Google translation.  Here’s their bottom line on Andrew Harrison:

Bottom Line:
He raises the level of play on his team because he leads by example with a competitive nature, focus and battle tested toughness. At his size he has blossoming lead guard skills and is terrific at making plays. What separates him from the rest is in his pace of play. His game is like a stop light he can go from green to yellow to red all in a moments notice.

Maybe I’m being harsh, but when a scout’s writing is barely literate, it makes it that much harder to trust their “expertise.” That isn’t valid basketball analysis– it more closely resembles a child’s attempt at writing poetry.

For all intents and purposes, high school scouts are casual fans who try their best to offer their best NBA projections of high school prospects.  Aside from the fact that extrapolating a player from high school to the pros is exceptionally difficult, it’s not a particularly prestigious position and does not attract the sharpest basketball minds. They are smart enough to know that LeBron James is great when they see him play, but they also have a number of baffling false positives.  If any of us actually met a collection of high school scouts and had the opportunity to pick their brains, I doubt we would come away with the sensation that they possess any sort of expert wisdom that we lack.

In order to maximize efficiency in prospect analysis, stuff like pedigree and hype should be almost entirely disregarded.  There may be exceptions for a player like Bradley Beal who was reputed as an elite shooter but ran cold from outside as a college freshman.  But when top prospects such as Andrew Wiggins or Julius Randle show troubling signs for their future, people seem slow to accept the relevance of these signs, as they feel that obvious warning signs are superseded by high school hype.  The bottom line is scouts don’t have any advantage over an intelligent basketball fan in information (at least not once we get a sizable college sample), analytical ability, or even expertise in assessing tools.  Personally I try to glean why they felt the way they did, take the perceived strengths for what they are worth, and then discard all bottom line conclusions as it is only noise that will dilute my own analysis.  Giving any more credence than that only leads to skewed perceptions and wrong conclusions.